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Auction Theory and Standstills:
Dealing with Friends and Foes in
a Sale of Corporate Control
Christina M. Sautter†
Abstract
A fundamental issue in Delaware mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
law is the extent to which a target company’s board of directors may
restrict a sales process to extract value from bidders and grant a
“winning bidder” certain deal protections that protect a transaction
from topping bids. Standstill agreements are one such form of deal
protection. Standstills prevent bidders from making or announcing a
bid for the target without the target’s consent, both during the sales
process and for a period after the sales process is completed and the
target has executed an agreement with a winning bidder. Recent
Delaware Court of Chancery rulings have placed a new spotlight on
the use of standstill agreements in M&A deals and specifically in
change-of-control transactions. In particular, these cases highlight the
restrictiveness of some standstills and open up discussion as to how
restrictive a standstill may be without violating a target company
board of directors’ duty to maximize stockholder value.
This Article makes a unique contribution. It is the first article to
apply auction theory in critiquing and evaluating the need for
standstills in M&A transactions. Auction theory is an applied branch
of economics used to design optimal bidding procedures and revenueenhancing auctions. The application of auction theory to standstills is
particularly well suited as the execution of a standstill is often cited
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as resulting in increased value during the sales process. Using auction
theory and recent Delaware case law as a foundation, this Article
provides a new framework for the use of standstills. It argues that to
the extent standstills provide an entry into the due diligence and
general sales processes, standstills may help to enhance value.
Moreover, the promise of standstill restrictions continuing postsigning
may aid in incentivizing bidders to submit their highest offers during
the presigning sale process. But the use of more restrictive
standstills—such as those in which a bidder agrees not to request a
waiver and a target agrees in advance not to waive a standstill,
known as Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive (DADW) standstills—should turn
on the amount of presigning shopping in which the target board has
engaged. This Article provides a new framework for deal makers and
courts, suggesting that if deal makers are to continue their use of
DADW standstills, they should be paired with a minimal fiduciary
out and a staggered termination fee.
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Introduction
A fundamental tension in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) law
exists between a selling company’s board of directors’ Revlon1 duty to
maximize stockholder value in a sale of control and the board’s ability
to restrict the sales process and grant a “winning bidder” certain
covenants that protect the transaction from being overbid.2 Standstill
agreements are one such way the board of a selling company, the
target, restricts the sales process and discourages overbids.3 In
particular, standstills prevent bidders who are participating in the
sales process from making or announcing a bid for the target without
the target’s consent, both during the sales process and for a period
after the process is completed and the target has executed an
agreement with a winning bidder.4
Standstills help the target to control the sales process and ensure
bidders do not preempt the process by making offers directly to the
target’s stockholders or by otherwise bidding before the target is
ready to receive offers.5 Moreover, presigning standstills may help a
board satisfy its Revlon duty to maximize stockholder value, as
standstills may provide the target board “leverage to extract

1.

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
182 (Del. 1986).

2.

See id. at 182 (describing a board of directors as “auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
company”); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d
914, 938 (Del. 2003) (describing the limitations on a board’s authority to
grant deal protections to a winning bidder). The term “overbid” is used in
this Article to refer to “topping bids” or “jumping bids,” situations in
which another prior bid or agreement is topped by a higher bid.

3.

The target and its financial advisor generally require that auction
participants execute a confidentiality agreement before gaining access to
the target’s nonpublic information. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey
Malenko, Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions,
J. Fin. (forthcoming) (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 9), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559481. The standstill
can be a separate standalone document or, more typically, it appears as
a provision in the confidentiality agreement. See Martin Marietta
Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 1218 n.43 (Del.
2012). The terms “standstill,” “standstill agreement,” and “standstill
provision” will be used interchangeably in this Article.

4.

See Martin Marietta, 68 A.3d at 1219 (“Typically a standstill agreement
will prohibit a hostile bid in any form . . . .”).

5.

William G. Lawlor, Taming the Tiger: Difficult Standstill Agreement
Issues for Targets, Deal Law., July–Aug. 2007, at 7 (noting that
standstills “provide[ ] a stable environment in which the sales process
can be managed and controlled by the target”).
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concessions from the parties who seek to make a bid.”6 Because most
standstills do not expire upon the target’s execution of a definitive
agreement with a winning bidder, most standstills are intended to
prevent later overbidding during the preclosing period, the time
between the signing and closing of the contemplated transaction.7 In
this way, targets and winning bidders use standstills as a type of dealprotection device preclosing. For these reasons, standstills have been
called “the M&A equivalent of a schoolyard ‘time-out.’”8 In other
words, standstills keep friendly bidders friendly and prevent them
from becoming foes either to the target or to the winning bidder.9
Despite the intended benefits of standstills, like any deal-protection
device, standstills are not without drawbacks. Because a target
board’s Revlon duties do not end at the execution of a definitive
agreement but instead continue until the stockholders vote on the
proposed transaction, standstills potentially hinder the board from
complying with its Revlon duties.10 More specifically, standstills
6.

In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007). In a
2011 case dealing with a standstill waiver, then-Chancellor Strine
reiterated this view:
I mean, it is pretty well understood that part of what you can
do as a first-in bidder who is actually binding yourself to buy a
company is get some deal protections that insure that, you
know, you won’t be topped lightly; that there aren’t free riders;
and then make the target board make certain determinations
before they get out of a merger agreement.
Status Conference and Motion to Expedite at 22, In re Transatlantic
Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. Nos. 6574-CS & 6776-CS, (Del. Ch.
Aug. 22, 2011).

7.

See Robert E. Spatt & Peter Martelli, The Four Ring CircusRound Sixteen; A Further Updated View of the Mating Dance
Among Announced Merger Partners and an Unsolicited
Second or Third Bidder 40 (2012); Christina M. Sautter, Promises
Made to be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control
Transactions, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. 929, 932 (2013).

8.

Proxy Battle Time-Out: Standstills Give Boards a Breather, Thomson
Reuters (Apr. 2, 2009), http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/
2009/07/20090731_0005.aspx?cid=&src=; see also Lawlor, supra note 5,
at 7 (describing standstills as “corporate peace treaties”).

9.

In this Article, the term “friendly” refers to negotiated acquisitions in
which the target company board approves the sale terms and is
receptive to a bidder’s overtures. Conversely, the term “foes” refers to
hostile transactions in which a bidder does not agree with the target
board’s decision regarding the sales process.

10.

See Steven M. Davidoff, Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers,
Government by Deal, and the Private Equity Implosion 236
(2009) (explaining that under Revlon a target “must keep itself up for
sale . . . up to a shareholder vote on the transaction”); Omnicare, Inc. v.
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) (“The directors of a
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prevent bidders from making overbids and may prevent boards from
considering overbids, even if an overbid provides more value than the
deal with the winning bidder.11 Moreover, there is always a risk that a
target board may use a standstill to improperly favor one bidder over
another or to otherwise entrench itself in office.12
Recently, the Delaware courts have issued several decisions
commenting on the restrictiveness of some standstills and their
potential interference with the satisfaction of a board’s Revlon
duties.13 As a result, there has been a surge in the attention being
paid to standstills by practitioners.14 But, to date, scholars have yet
to address the dichotomy that standstills raise between aiding and
hindering value maximization. In a recently published article, I
touched upon this dichotomy by using past Delaware case law to
Delaware corporation have a continuing obligation to discharge their
fiduciary responsibilities, as future circumstances develop, after a merger
agreement is announced.”).
11.

See In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304–VCP, 2012 WL
1020471, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (describing how under a DADW
standstill, a target company “could not reach out to [already-interested
buyer companies], and those [buyer] companies could not reach out to
[the target] to take the necessary first step—requesting a waiver of the
standstill restrictions—to make a competing offer”); Paul Povel &
Rajdeep Singh, Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders, 19 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 1399, 1402 (2006) (“[Deal-protection] devices make the
target less attractive to rejected bidders, thereby reducing their
incentive to top up the winning bid.”).

12.

In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007).

13.

See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012); Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., C.A.
No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013); In re
Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988–CS (Del. Ch.
Dec. 17, 2012); Celera Corp., 2012 WL 1020471; In re Rehabcare Grp.,
Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197–VCL, 2011 Del Ch. LEXIS 208 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 8, 2011); Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58.

14.

See, e.g., Steven M. Haas, “Don’t Ask/Don’t Waive” Standstill
Agreements Under Attack, Insights, Dec. 2012, at 29; Peter J.
Walsh Jr. et. al., Delaware Insider: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” Standstill
Provisions: Impermissible Limitation on Director Fiduciary Obligations
or Legitimate, Value-Maximizing Tool?, Bus. L. Today, Jan. 2013,
at 1; An Ounce of Prevention—Some Guidance for Target Boards,
Kirkland M&A Update (Kirkland & Ellis LLP), Jan. 14, 2013, at 2;
The State of M&A Standstills in Delaware, Client Alert (Hunton &
Williams LLP), Jan. 2013; Trevor S. Norwitz, Igor Kirman & William
Savitt, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills” Revisited (Rapidly), CLS
Blue Sky Blog (Jan. 9, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2013/01/09/dont-ask-dont-waive-standstills-revisited-rapidly/; William
Savitt, Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance & Fin. Reg. (Dec. 18, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/18/dont-ask-dont-waive-standstills/.
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analyze how the Delaware courts are likely to address some open
issues involving standstills.15 My analysis assumed, however, the
continued existence of standstills as they are currently being utilized
in most M&A transactions and did not address the fundamental
issues of the extent to which boards may use standstills to restrict the
sales process or protect an executed deal.16
This Article addresses these fundamental issues by applying
auction theory to critique and evaluate the role of standstills in M&A
transactions. Auction theory is an applied branch of economics used
to design optimal bidding procedures and revenue-enhancing sales
processes. The application of auction theory to standstills is
particularly well suited because targets require the execution of
standstills based on the assumption that standstills help to increase
value during the sales process. Despite deal makers’ assumption that
standstills are revenue enhancing, legal scholars have not used auction
theory to examine standstills and test this assumption until now.
In applying auction theory to standstills, this Article makes a
unique contribution to M&A legal scholarship by providing answers
to some fundamental questions presented by every sale of corporate
control. Part I of this Article describes auction theory as it relates to
the M&A sales process. Part II describes the use of standstills in the
typical M&A sales process. Part III details a target board’s fiduciary
duties in the context of a sale of corporate control and explores the
typical sales processes used by public companies. Part IV details
Delaware cases addressing the need for and possible enforcement of
various standstills. Part V uses auction theory and recent Delaware
cases to develop a new framework for deal makers and courts, taking
into consideration the amount of presigning shopping done by the
target board. Among other things, this new framework suggests that
if deal makers continue using certain more restrictive standstills, then
they should pair them with a minimal fiduciary out and a staggered
termination fee.

I.

Auction Theory and Standstills

There is a substantial body of literature on auction theory
generally and an increasing amount of literature on auction theory in
the M&A context. Little of this literature specifically focuses on dealprotection devices, and none of it explicitly addresses the use of
standstills in the auction process. This Article addresses this gap and
15.

See generally Sautter, supra note 7, at 936 (outlining the article’s
discussion of a target board’s ability to consider a third party’s superior
offer made in contravention of a standstill; a board’s promise not to
waive a standstill; and a board’s ability to grant a winning bidder the
right to enforce a previously executed standstill against a losing bidder).

16.

See id. at 992–93.
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uses auction theory to propose a new framework for the use of
standstills in change-of-control transactions.
Academics have used auction theory to attempt to design sales
processes that produce optimal revenue-maximizing auctions.17
Auction theory is “develop[ing] rapidly, and is increasingly being
looked to for assistance in practical applications,” but current auction
theory is by no means complete.18 One practical application that may
have the greatest impact is in the M&A field, which undoubtedly
contains one of the largest markets for auctions. Given the size of any
typical M&A transaction and corporate fiduciary duties, there are few
areas that could benefit more from an optimal sales process. And if
auction theory could be used to design optimal auctions in M&A
transactions, then theoretically the outcome of an auction should be
controllable largely through the structure of the sales process. Yet
while it is an admirable goal, controlling the outcome of a sales
process by designing an optimal structure is likely not an achievable
goal for intricate M&A transactions.19 This is largely because many
factors can impact the results of any given sales process, and it is
difficult, if not impossible, to predict or control for these factors.20
Despite these limitations, there is much from auction theory that
can be applied to M&A transactions. Part I.A begins by discussing
the impact of bidder type on auction results, and Part I.B follows by
discussing the role played by information and auction theorists’
suggested strategies to obtain optimal auction results. As discussed in
Part V, both of these factors—bidder type and information flow—are
relevant to the purpose and proper use of standstills.
A.

Common-Value Versus Private-Value Sales Processes

Auction theorists have pointed to the type of bidders involved in
a sales process as one of the many factors impacting the ultimate
results of the process.21 Although real-world M&A auctions tend to

17.

See generally Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the
Literature, 13 J. Econ. Survs. 227 (1999) (providing a survey of
auction theory and discussing optimal auction design).

18.

Id. at 248.

19.

But see Steven J. Brams & Joshua R. Mitts, Mechanism Design in
M&A Auctions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 873, 884 (2014) (disagreeing with
the assertion that an optimal M&A auction cannot be designed).

20.

See Klemperer, supra note 17, at 234–47 (discussing many factors that
impact auctions).

21.

E.g., Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1399–1400 (discussing the
reduced competition that can result from unequally informed bidders,
particularly because less-informed bidders are more concerned with “the
winner’s curse” of beating a better-informed bidder but regrettably
overpaying for the target).
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include both financial and strategic buyers,22 auction theorists usually
address each type of bidder separately.23 Thus, an article relying on
auction theory would be remiss if it did not address the differences
between these two bidders and resulting auction types.
When financial buyers are the bidders in an auction, academics
tend to define those auctions as common-value auctions.24 A commonvalue auction is an auction in which all of the participants have the
same or very similar value for the target.25 This is the case with
financial buyers because they can “exploit the same sources of gains
(e.g., cost cutting, financial restructuring).”26 Conversely, a privatevalue auction is one in which each bidder has a certain value it is
willing to pay but is not aware of the value other bidders are willing
to pay.27 Strategic, or trade, buyers are often interested in acquiring a
target company to optimize possible unique synergies between the
buyer and the target.28 Thus, strategic buyers tend to have differing
values for a target based on the value each individual strategic buyer
places on those particular synergies.29 Therefore, auction processes
involving strategic bidders tend to be private-value auctions.30 One
exception to this general rule occurs if the target’s management has
teamed up with a financial buyer to engage in a management-led
buyout (“MBO”); then, the MBO team likely has better information
regarding the target’s value than the typical financial buyer.31 In such
a case, the bidding process resembles the private-value auction.
22.

Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 1) (“The
set of bidders [for an M&A takeover auction] is comprised of two
groups: strategic and financial.”).

23.

E.g., Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, Toeholds and
Takeovers, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 427, 428 (1999) (acknowledging the
difference between strategic and financial bidders but focusing their
analysis on cases involving the latter). But see Gorbenko & Malenko,
supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 1–2) (analyzing the differences
between financial and strategic bidders’ valuations of target companies);
Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1340 (“Unlike the existing
literature . . . , our model allows for both private value and common
value bidding environments.”).

24.

E.g., Bulow, Huang & Klemperer, supra note 23, at 428.

25.

J. Russel Denton, Note, Stacked Deck: Go-Shops and Auction Theory,
60 Stan. L. Rev. 1529, 1534 (2008).

26.

Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.

27.

Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and
Competitive Bidding, 50 Econometrica 1089, 1090 (1982).

28.

Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.

29.

Denton, supra note 25, at 1535.

30.

See Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.

31.

Id. at 1399.
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The types of bidders involved in an auction impact the auction
results because strategic and financial bidders tend to value targets in
systematically different ways.32 Generally, strategic bidders are more
likely to pay more “for targets with higher investment opportunities,
as proxied by [research and development] expenditures and cash
balances.”33 Conversely, financial bidders are more likely to pay more
relative to market value for underperforming companies, a
characteristic “reflected in substantial negative cash flows.”34
The differing valuations between strategic and financial bidders
arise from the differences in information between these general types
of bidders who “are not always equally well informed” as well as from
the type of information upon which each group tends to rely.35 In fact,
“[a] key feature of auctions is the presence of asymmetric information.
(With perfect information most auction models are relatively easy to
solve).”36 Of course, strategic bidders and buyers engaged in an MBO
have asymmetric information because each bidder uses its own private
information to value the object of the auction.37 That is, strategic
bidders have superior information on the target either due to their
status as insiders or due to how they value the company based on
particular synergies. In fact, strategic bidders “are less tied to
observable[ ] [characteristics]” like financial statements or market
indicators and demonstrate greater variation on the “unobserved
valuation component.”38
Financial bidders can also have asymmetric information.39 While
their actual value of the target is the same—at least theoretically
after the fact—each bidder has different private information about
what the value actually is.40 For example, in the case of a corporation,
while the value of the underlying assets should produce the same
returns for any financial buyer in the long run, the bidder’s valuation
estimates of those future returns may differ. But, as Professors
32.

Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 2) (arguing
that “strategic and financial bidders appear to be inherently very
different” and, in particular, that “a significant subset of targets is
systematically valued more by financial bidders”).

33.

Id. at 4.

34.

Id.

35.

Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1399.

36.

Klemperer, supra note 17, at 229.

37.

Denton, supra note 25, at 1535.

38.

Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 6) (“[T]he
estimated standard deviation of [strategic bidders’] unobserved valuation
component is almost twice as high as that of financial bidders.”).

39.

Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1405.

40.

Klemperer, supra note 17, at 229–30.
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Gorbenko and Malenko explain in their forthcoming article, Strategic
and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions, financial bidders’
valuations tend to be based on “observable target and economy-wide
characteristics.”41 Thus, the end result is that, unlike strategic
bidders, financial bidders’ valuations “appear to be more
interchangeable than strategic bidders from the target’s point of
view.”42 But if a financial bidder already owns a similar company, the
financial bidder would resemble a strategic bidder because it would be
able to derive certain synergies from the purchase of the target.
Even granting these distinctions in the real world of M&A deal
making, the classification of an auction as a pure common-value one
or a pure private-value one is not necessarily accurate. As previously
mentioned, typical M&A transactions include a mix of both financial
and strategic bidders. Moreover, “[a]ctual bidders rarely have
identical valuations for an auctioned object nor are their valuations
completely uncorrelated.”43 As Professor Subramanian recognized in
his book, Negotiauctions, “[e]ven with a seemingly pure private-value
asset, there is a significant common-value element.”44 Thus,
information will not be perfectly symmetric among all buyers because,
even if they are all using the same information about the target
company, each bidder evaluates that information differently. In these
situations involving asymmetric bidders, Professors Povel and Singh
argue that “more biased procedures” should be used in the sale
process, including deal-protection devices.45
B.

Information in the Sales Process

The unique interpretation of information each bidder brings to
the sales table impacts the question of whether standstills enhance the
bidding process. This uniqueness is especially relevant because
standstills are inextricably tied to the provision of information.
Numerous auction theorists have explored the role of information in
the sales process, and some have proposed strategies to manage the
flow and asymmetry of information in auctions. While there are
several unaccounted-for factors that impact M&A transactions, one
auction-theory proposal comes close to meeting the needs of M&A
deals.

41.

Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 5–6).

42.

Id. at 6.

43.

Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform
Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 27, 29 (1991).

44.

Guhan
Subramanian,
Negotiauctions:
New
Dealmaking
Strategies for a Competitive Marketplace 93 (2010).

45.

Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1417.

531

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
Auction Theory and Standstills

Professors Bulow and Klemperer have found that “contrary to our
usual instinct that auctions are profitable because they are efficient, it
is precisely the inefficiency of the auction—that entry into it is
relatively ill-informed and therefore leads to a more random
outcome—that makes it more profitable for the seller.”46 Once bidders
have entered the auction, Professors Boone and Mulherin have found
there is a fine line that targets must walk when revealing proprietary
information to bidders. In particular, receiving proprietary
information causes bidders to be more certain about their valuation of
the company and, in turn, bid higher.47 At the same time, however, a
target’s provision of confidential information can “reduce the inherent
value of the selling firm” because losing bidders can “gain knowledge
that confers competitive advantages.”48 As a result, a seller’s
management of the sales process, limiting the number and kind of
bidders and otherwise managing the process to reduce information
costs, can “actually create value.”49
Some have argued, based on the Revenue Equivalence Theorem,
or the logic of marginal revenue versus marginal cost, that even by
taking into account asymmetric information, an optimal auction, in
theory, can be created.50 This particular theorem states that the
auction type does not influence the revenue produced by an auction,
regardless of the information each bidder has.51 Under the theorem,
“all the ‘standard’ auctions . . . yield the same expected revenue
under the stated conditions, as do many non-standard auctions.”52
However, this theory “appl[ies] very generally” and rests on a number
of assumptions, including that bidders are risk neutral; that bidders’
private information is independent of competitors’ private
information; and that bidders’ private values are drawn from a
46.

Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer
Auctions?, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1544, 1546 (2009).

47.

Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Is There One Best Way to Sell a
Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales, 21 J.
Applied Corp. Fin. 28, 33 (2009) (“[W]hen bidding companies are
confident that their own offers will not be trumped by that of
‘uninformed’ and perhaps overly aggressive bidders, they are likely to
offer to pay higher prices . . . .”).

48.

Id. at 34; see also Justin Pettit et al., Roundtable Discussion: Auctions
in the M&A Process, Financier Worldwide, Nov. 2007, available at
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%26A_Proc
ess.pdf (“The seller in an auction risks opening itself up to tactical
investigation by competitors.”).

49.

Boone & Mulherin, supra note 47, at 28.

50.

Klemperer, supra note 17, at 232–33.

51.

Id. at 232.

52.

Id.
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common distribution.53 But more recent developments have suggested
that standard auctions cannot be optimal in the presence of bidder
asymmetry and that an increase in bidder asymmetry can hurt the
seller if it uses a standard auction.54
Even if optimal auctions could be created by varying these
assumptions,55 many other factors can influence the outcome of an
auction, and most models have not been extended to completely
account for these effects.56 Unaccounted-for factors include the entry
costs and number of bidders; the ability of bidders to collude; and the
divisibility of the unit for sale in the auction, or multiunit auctions.57
The idea of a multiunit auction or the divisibility of a business into
separate units is generally not examined in auction-theory literature.58
However, this singular focus may be misplaced when using auctiontheory literature to interpret M&A transactions because of the large
number of divisible assets comprising a business. Of the literature
that does focus on multiunit auctions, the “main message . . . is that
it is very hard to achieve efficient outcomes.”59 Furthermore, most
existing auction-theory literature only allows for the case of either
private-value or common-value bidding environments—that is, an
auction that only contains either financial or strategic buyers, but not
both.60 But the likelihood of such distinct classifications is not
realistic.61
Nonetheless, at least one proposal has been made, by Professors
Povel and Singh, setting forth a “simple and realistic” optimal selling
procedure to incorporate these asymmetries that could be particularly
applicable to M&A transactions.62 Their model of a sequential-selling
procedure “requires commitment to its rules, and deal-protection

53.

Id. at 232, 236.

54.

Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1403.

55.

See Klemperer, supra note 17, at 234–36 (summarizing auction-theory
literature finding that optimal auctions can be created in some cases
regardless of assumptions).

56.

See id. at 234–47 (discussing the implications of various factors on the
results of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, making creation of
efficient optimal auctions difficult).

57.

Id. at 238–243.

58.

Id. at 240 (“Most auction theory . . . restricts attention to the sale of a
single indivisible unit.”).

59.

Id. at 243.

60.

Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.

61.

Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 21–22).

62.

Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.
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devices [to] help the target cement this commitment.”63 But as
Professor Subramanian has pointed out:
Auctions in the real world are messy. The rules are unclear
and constantly changing. Price is just one of the many terms
to be decided. The seller is not a passive participant after
establishing the rules of the game. All of these real-world
factors violate the fundamental assumptions on which much of
auction theory is based.64

In the present state of auction theory, even if Professors Povel and
Singh’s model allowed for an optimal selling procedure in real-world
M&A deals, the model likely could not do so alone. Some other
structural-protection device would be needed to ensure the best
bidding process and optimal outcomes.

II. Standstills in the Sales Process
One structural-protection device used in the vast majority of
public-company sales is the standstill. Standstills generally prevent
potential buyers from engaging in activity that may be considered
hostile to the target. More specifically, “a standstill agreement will
prohibit a hostile bid in any form, including a tender offer to acquire
stock control of the other contracting party and/or a proxy contest to
replace all or some of its directors.”65 Although standstills can be
standalone agreements, most appear as a provision in a confidentiality
agreement. Despite the close affiliation between standstill agreements
and confidentiality agreements, the two agreements serve vitally
different functions. Specifically, the confidentiality agreement is
intended to prevent the use or disclosure of nonpublic information,
whereas the standstill is intended to regulate the manner in which a
party may gain control over the target.66 Along these lines,
“[s]tandstill prohibitions do not require, or in any way depend upon, a
contracting party’s use or disclosure of the other party’s confidential,
nonpublic information.”67 At the same time, the main purpose of
including a standstill in a confidentiality agreement is to prevent the
buyer from having an “informational advantage over other
prospective bidders resulting from its review of confidential

63.

Id. at 1425.

64 . Subramanian, supra note 44, at 119.
65.

Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208,
1219 (Del. 2012).

66.

Id. at 1219.

67.

Id.
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information.”68 Hence, standstills give “teeth” to confidentiality
agreements that alone may not be enough to establish insider-trading
liability under current federal securities laws.69
Standstills have been described as the “cost of entry” into
discussions with a target.70 In fact, some, if not most, targets will
refuse to proceed with negotiations if the bidder refuses to execute the
standstill.71 The standstill “serves as a kind of litmus test, an
indication of the bidder’s true intentions.”72 A bidder can “try to
modify the standstill as much as [it] can,” but by executing the
standstill the bidder is forsaking its “ability to launch an unsolicited
offer.”73
Because standstills work to restrict bidders, the duration of these
restrictions can become a significant issue during negotiations.
Typically, “auction-style standstill agreements last only one or two
years, on the basis that the confidential information to be provided to
the bidders will have useful currency for only a relatively short
time.”74 Standstills can be longer than a year and even up to five
years, but generally standstills “with expirations between six months
and one year are not uncommon; although, one year may be the
norm.”75 For example, one commonly negotiated aspect of a standstill
68.

William J. Carney, Mergers and Acquisitions: Cases and
Materials 157 (3d ed. 2011).

69.

See Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”:
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), Confidentiality Agreements, and the Proper Scope of
Insider Trading Liability, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1469, 1486 (2010) (“[This
Note] finds that liability cannot be based on confidentiality agreements
alone, for although the [United States] Supreme Court has been willing
to stretch the duty requirement in the past, the Court has always
required more than a duty to keep information in confidence.”).

70.

Interview with Steve Wolitzer, Global Head of Mergers & Acquisitions,
Lehman Brothers, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (June 4, 2003), quoted in Guhan
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses,
113 Yale L.J. 621, 660 (2003).

71.

See Nicole E. Clark, Preliminary Agreements, in Doing Deals 2009:
Understanding the Nuts & Bolts of Transactional Practice
73, 80–81 (2009) (stating that a target generally asks a bidder to
execute a standstill in exchange for confidential information); Meryl S.
Rosenblatt, Letters of Intent and Exclusivity, Confidentiality and
Standstill Agreements, in Drafting Corporate Agreements 2002–
2003, at 95, 117 (2002) (noting that a target may require a standstill to
ensure that the buyer remains committed to the transaction and to
prevent the buyer from pursuing a hostile alternative).

72.

Bruce Wasserstein, Big Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions in the
Digital Age 689 (2000).

73.

Subramanian, supra note 70, at 662.

74.

Lawlor, supra note 5, at 12.

75.

Sautter, supra note 7, at 948 (citing Subramanian, supra note 70, at 660).
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is whether the standstill will include a fall-away provision. One
practitioner described a fall-away provision as an “escape hatch” for a
buyer.76 A fall-away provision provides that the standstill restrictions
would no longer apply if another bidder not bound by a standstill
makes an offer for the target or if the target executes a definitive
acquisition agreement with another bidder.77 A target may resist this
provision fearing it may prevent the bidder from submitting its best
offer during the presigning sales process.78 But targets often end up
agreeing to the fall-away provision as a way of moving along the sales
process.79 Moreover, targets recognize the possibility that a fall-away
provision ultimately may result in the target realizing a greater sales
price.80 Nevertheless, some practitioners argue that whether a target
should agree to a fall-away standstill is context specific. For example,
if the target has decided that it “is going to run a process that’s going
to end in a sale,” a target may be more willing to agree to a fall-away
provision.81 As is evident from the foregoing, whether a standstill falls
away is often a matter of some debate and can directly impact the
ultimate price received.
Another debatable matter among practitioners and judges is the
viability and enforceability of Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive (DADW)
standstills. DADW standstills are actually a form of standstill
restriction that emanate from two different contracts.82 First, the
“Don’t Ask” portion of the restriction comes from a provision in the
standstill itself that prevents a potential bidder who executed the
standstill from requesting a waiver of the standstill.83 Second, the
“Don’t Waive” portion of the restriction comes from a provision in
the merger agreement that prevents a target board from granting a
76.

Richard E. Climan et al., Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies
in Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116 Penn St. L.
Rev. 615, 645 (2012) (transcribed panel discussion).

77.

Id.

78.

Savitt, supra note 14 (“Sellers usually resist fall-aways both to prevent
bidders from holding back and to induce them, by promising certainty,
to put their best offer on the table.”).

79.

See Climan, supra note 76, at 647 (describing a “fall-away trigger that
[targets] often just agree to, because people start to get ossified in their
positions”).

80.

Id. (“At the end of the day, if you have what you think is the highest
price in an auction, it’s not a bad thing that [the bidder] wants to come
in and put more money on the table.”).

81.

Id.

82.

“Don’t
Ask,
Don’t
Waive”
Restrictions
in
Standstill
Agreements, Prac. L. (July 11, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/2-5341026?source=rss.

83.

Id.
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waiver of a preexisting standstill.84 Because these restrictions may
hinder a board’s ability to fully exercise its fiduciary duties, DADW
standstills have become the subject of much current-day debate.

III. Fiduciary Duties and M&A Sale Processes
In analyzing standstills and their related subprovisions, auction
theory cannot be considered in a vacuum, as there are other
significant considerations in the context of a sale of a publicly traded,
Delaware corporation. Namely, a well-developed body of Delaware
case law governing a target board’s fiduciary duties significantly
influences such sales. Moreover, there is the practical consideration
regarding the processes by which targets actually go about selling
themselves. Part III.A first details the fiduciary duties applicable to a
target board’s actions in a sale of corporate control. Then Part III.B
describes the various sales methods upheld by Delaware courts and
available to a target board. The role of standstills in each sale method
is emphasized.
A.

Fiduciary Duties in a Sale of Corporate Control

The seminal Delaware Supreme Court case of Revlon Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.85 provides that once a sale of
corporate control becomes inevitable, “a board’s primary duty
becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the company to
the highest bidder.”86 Since this holding, the Delaware Supreme Court
has recognized that “no single blueprint” exists for a board to satisfy
its Revlon duties.87 The courts have acknowledged that not every sale
requires a full-blown auction process but rather the board of directors
of a selling corporation must meet “a reasonableness standard.”88
Moreover, in selecting an acquirer and rejecting other offers, boards
are not bound to make that decision solely based on the price being
offered. Instead, the target board may consider a variety of factors,
including the offer’s terms and feasibility, financing, the likelihood of
consummation of the proposed transaction, and “the bidder’s identity,

84.

Id.

85.

506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).

86.

Id. at 184.

87.

Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).

88.

Transcript of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 88,
Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, C.A., No. 5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24,
2011); see also Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (“Revlon does not demand
that every change in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded
by a heated bidding contest.”).
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prior background and other business venture experiences.”89 Along
these lines, deal certainty is of primary importance, and it is not
uncommon for targets to choose a lower-priced bid over a higherpriced one based on closing certainty. Furthermore, just because a
company is in Revlon mode does not prevent a target’s board “from
offering bidders deal protections, so long as its decision to do so was
reasonably directed to the objective of getting the highest price, and
not” a self-dealing goal “to tilt the playing field towards a particular
bidder for reasons unrelated to the stockholders’ ability to get top
dollar.”90
A board’s decision to offer deal protections to bidders is subject to
the Unocal91/Unitrin92 enhanced-scrutiny analysis as described in the
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc.93 The Unocal/Unitrin enhanced-scrutiny standard
involves a two-step analysis, the first step of which involves the board
showing that it “had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger
to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.”94 Under the second step,
the court first determines whether the deal-protection devices are
“preclusive” or “coercive.”95 Once the court determines that the deal
protections are neither coercive nor preclusive, the court examines the
“range of reasonableness” of the board’s decision.96
In explicitly extending the Unocal/Unitrin enhanced-scrutiny
analysis to deal-protection devices, the majority in Omnicare stated:
Defensive devices taken to protect a merger agreement executed
by a board of directors are intended to give that agreement an
advantage over any subsequent transactions that materialize
89.

Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29
(Del. 1988).

90.

In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000–01 (Del. Ch.
2005) (citing Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286).

91.

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

92.

Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).

93.

818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). In Omnicare, the Delaware Supreme Court
applied the Unocal/Unitrin enhanced scrutiny to deal protections in a
non-change-of-control transaction. Id. at 931–32. Similarly, in Toys “R”
Us, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery applied the Unocal/Unitrin
enhanced scrutiny to termination fees in a change-of-control transaction.
877 A.2d at 1016.

94.

Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

95.

Id. (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

96.

Id. at 931–32 (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387–88) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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before the merger is approved by the stockholders and
consummated. This is analogous to the favored treatment that a
board of directors may properly give to encourage an initial
bidder when it discharges its fiduciary duties under Revlon.97

Thus, in a change-of-control transaction, the board’s decision to enter
into a merger agreement with a particular bidder and the process
leading up to the merger agreement are subject to the Revlon
standard, while the deal protections are subject to the Unocal/Unitrin
enhanced-scrutiny standard as described in Omnicare.98
B.

M&A Sales Processes

The Delaware courts have upheld a variety of sale methods as
meeting the Revlon reasonableness standard. This section explores the
typical sales methods used in a sale of corporate control and upheld
by the Delaware courts: a classic public auction, presigning market
canvass, negotiated acquisition, and postsigning market checks.
Although this Article addresses each of these sale methods on an
individual basis, many targets may use a combination of two or more
of these methods in any one transaction.
1.

Classic Full-Blown Auction

The classic full-blown auction is generally thought to be the
simplest way for a board to ensure satisfaction of its fiduciary duties
presigning.99 Not only is a classic auction thought to be the easiest
way to prove compliance with fiduciary duties but, as Professors
97.

Id. at 932 (emphasis added).

98.

See Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J.
Corp. L. 681, 685 n.24, 703 n.98 (2013) (describing the Delaware Court
of Chancery’s use of the Unocal standard of review for deal-protection
devices in Revlon transactions).

99.

See Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 746 (“A wide-ranging auction
generally maximizes value, particularly since the ‘best buyer’ on paper is
not always the party who eventually pays the highest price.”); Samuel
C. Thompson, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers 5-205
(PLI electronic ed. rel. 4 Sept. 2012) (2010) (recognizing the best way to
sell publicly held companies may be through “active and fair auction[s]”
and stating that “[a]ctual market testing through an auction may be
more beneficial than relying solely on investment bankers to assess
valuation”); Pettit et al., supra note 48 (“The basics of what sellers are
looking for in an auction remain the same: maximum price, high
certainty of completing the transaction and management’s preferred
buyer.”); see also Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended
Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops The Development,
Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of
Control Transactions, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 525, 576 (2008) (noting
Delaware courts consider public auctions or presigning targeted market
canvasses to be value-maximization procedures).
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Bulow and Klemperer found in a recent study, “the straightforward,
level-playing-field competition that an auction creates is usually more
profitable for a seller than a sequential process.”100 However, in
another study of 400 takeovers of U.S. corporations during the 1990s,
Professors Boone and Mulherin found that there were not substantial
differences between the wealth effects resulting from auctions versus
those resulting from negotiations.101 Despite finding that auctions were
not necessarily better at maximizing stockholder value than
negotiations, Professors Boone and Mulherin found that half of the
400 takeovers studied resulted from an auction process.102 Thus, the
auction process is certainly a popular form of sale even if business
scholars debate whether it is more beneficial to stockholders than
negotiations.
Generally, the auction begins with the preparation of an offering
memorandum describing in detail the target’s business.103 At the same
time the offering memorandum is being prepared, the target’s
financial advisor creates a list of potential purchasers.104 The financial
advisor then contacts the potential purchasers, and those potential
buyers who express an interest in the target are required to execute a
confidentiality agreement before being given the offering
memorandum and, in some cases, other information.105 In most deals,
the confidentiality agreement will contain a standstill.106 Thus, auction
participants enter the auction process without first determining the
value of the company and without knowing what other bidders will

100. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1545.
101. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, How are Firms Sold?, 62 J.
Finance. 847, 871 (2007).
102. Id. at 869.
103. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 746.
104. Id. at 746; see also Robert G. Hansen, Auctions of Companies,
39 Econ. Inquiry 30, 30 (2001) (stating that a potential-bidder list
likely includes “competitors, suppliers, customers, and acquisitionoriented conglomerates or leveraged buyout houses”).
105. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 746.
106. Climan, supra note 76, at 637.
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bid.107 It is this lack of knowledge that Professors Bulow and
Klemperer contend enhance value maximization in an auction.108
At a predetermined date pursuant to the target’s bidding
procedures, the interested bidders are required to submit a
preliminary, nonbinding indication of interest.109 These indications of
interest “will be either a number or a range of numbers that are
supposed to represent ‘bidders’ first approximations of their estimates
of value of the target.’”110 The target and its financial advisor usually
then narrow the field of bidders based on the prices contained in the
indications of interest and other factors.111 At this point, the narrowed
field of bidders is asked to participate in a second round of bidding.112
This is usually the point at which the target’s management will hold
presentations for the bidders, the bidders will receive access to either
an online or physical data room to perform due diligence, and plant or
site visits will occur.113 In some cases, bidders will be expected to
complete their due diligence reviews before final bids are submitted.114
Thus, the final bids will not be subject to satisfactory completion of
due diligence.115 In addition, the target will send the final bidders a
107. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1545. A prominent investment
banker, Bruce Wasserstein, explained, “The auction format naturally
creates tension—especially the blind auction, in which bidders are not
told how many other parties they are competing against. . . . If the
auctioneer is able and the integrity of the process is maintained, even a
single bidder can be induced to enter a ‘full’ bid.” Wasserstein, supra
note 72, at 748 (emphasis added).
108. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1546 (“[C]ontrary to our usual
instinct that auctions are profitable because they are efficient, it is
precisely the inefficiency of the auction—that entry into it is relatively
ill-informed and therefore leads to a more random outcome—that makes
it more profitable for the seller.”); see also Afra Afsharipour, A
Shareholders’ Put Option: Counteracting the Acquirer Overpayment
Problem, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1018, 1041 (2012) (“First, since a target’s
real value is unknown at the time of the acquisition, ‘habitually
optimistic [managers are] therefore likely to overestimate a target’s
value.’ Second, managers may overpay because they are ignorant of
bidding theory and are vulnerable to the ‘winner’s curse.’ Thus, on
average, for an asset whose value is unknown, the winning bid is the one
that overestimates the value of the asset.”) (citations omitted).
109. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 746.
110. Hansen, supra note 104, at 31.
111. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 747.
112. Id.
113. Id.; Hansen, supra note 104, at 31.
114. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 747.
115. See id. (noting that in certain instances the bid winner is announced on
the final bid date).
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sample purchase agreement that the final bidders will mark up and
return with their offers on the final bid date.116
The auction winner is chosen based in large part on the offer
price, but other factors, including the purchase-agreement mark ups,
can play a significant role.117 For example, financing, antitrust issues,
closing certainty, and reverse termination fees are just some of the
factors that targets may consider in choosing an auction winner.118
Generally, these auctions are “sealed-bid” auctions, meaning that the
bidders do not know the terms of the other bidders’ bids, and the
final bids remain final.119 However, some auctions are “dripping wax”
auctions in which the purportedly “‘final bids’ are not actually
final.”120 In such an auction, the “seller goes back to the few highest
bidders, with the high bid used as leverage over the others in an
attempt to force a raise. If successful, the new prices can be used
against the former high bidder.”121
As Wasserstein has noted, an auction’s success depends in large
part on how the auction is run, with an emphasis on the selective
release of information during the auction process.122 Although the
information provided to bidders in the offering memorandum and
through due diligence “is extensive, it is not complete.”123 Thus,
bidders will likely have asymmetric information largely based on how
116. Id.
117. See id. (stating that “[p]rice often is the determining factor in an
auction” and that differentiating between bidders who have submitted
“unfavorable contract[s]” versus bidders who have submitted “‘clean’”
contracts can also play a crucial role); see also Jack & Suzy Welch, OpEd, Why Joe Biden is Wrong About Private Equity Execs, Fortune,
July 2, 2012, at 42 (“Usually several firms are vying for the business,
but it’s not accurate to assume that price is the sole determinant of who
wins. Just as critical many times is a [private equity] firm’s ability to
bring contentious stakeholders to a shared vision of the future. The
result is that private equity managers are experienced in the art of
getting tough deals done.”).
118. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 72 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(listing such factors as reasons to deny the bidder continued friendly
negotiations); see also Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 747 (“[O]ne
bidder might offer a high price, an unfavorable contract, and no
concrete details regarding financing. Another bidder might be willing to
pay less, but offer a ‘clean’ contract and quick closure.”).
119. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 747.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 748 (“If the process is managed correctly, bidders will be
pulled along by the desire for more data.”).
123. Hansen, supra note 104, at 32. As Professor Hansen states, “Throughout
the auction process, potential buyers may ask for information that the
selling company will view as too confidential to reveal.” Id.
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the bidders interpret the information provided to them in the due
diligence period as well as based on the preexisting information
already in their possession.
Although some scholars view public auctions as the best way to
maximize stockholder value, there are certainly situations in which a
public auction is not desirable. One such situation is when a board
views an auction as placing the company at a competitive
disadvantage.124 For example, if a company conducts a public auction,
the company risks losing employees, customers, and suppliers.125 In
addition, the company also runs the risk of being viewed by the
market for corporate control as “damaged goods” if the auction is
unsuccessful.126 Thus, in the event of a failed auction, it may take
some time for a company to successfully sell itself.127 Furthermore,
although potential bidders are required to execute confidentiality
agreements before being provided with a confidential offering
memorandum or commencing due diligence, companies also risk
proprietary or sensitive information being disseminated to the public
generally and, in particular, to competitors.128 In some cases, the
target may have already been approached by a potential purchaser
whose bid may be lost if the target board were to choose to engage in
a full-blown auction.129 Another common situation in which targets
124. The Delaware Court of Chancery also recognizes the potential risks involved
with a public auction. See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573,
597 (Del. Ch. 2010) (implying leaked auctions may upset target’s employee
base); cf. In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 21 (Del. Ch.
2004) (recognizing benefits of single-bidder approaches).
125. See In re Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 (recognizing possible employee
strife resulting from a leaked auction); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc.,
C.A. Nos. 9536, 9561, 1991 WL 165304, at *668–69 (Del. Ch. July 31,
1991) (stating the board resisted an auction or market canvass fearing
adverse effects on the target’s “relationships with its employees,
customers and suppliers”); Steven M. Davidoff, What the Sound and
Fury Over Best Buy May Signify, N.Y. Times Dealbook (Aug. 23,
2012, 12:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/whatthe-sound-and-fury-over-best-buy-may-signify/ (“Typically, targets are
quite skittish about publicly talking about negotiations. The reason is
that this type of back and forth is unsettling for the company’s
employees and operations.”).
126. Pettit et al., supra note 48.
127. See Comm. on Negotiated Acquisitions, Am. Bar Ass’n, The
M&A Process: A Practical Guide for the Business Lawyer 94
(2005) (detailing the disadvantages of auctions, including the length of
time to sell a company after a failed auction).
128. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 62 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(noting a target’s “legitimate proprietary concerns” about sharing
information with a competitor).
129. See, e.g., id. at 70 (stating that the buyer’s bid was contingent on the
target not conducting a public auction); In re Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 604
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choose to forgo a public auction is when there are a limited number of
viable potential buyers. This is typically a result of the target’s
business type or its financial situation.130 For example, a multibilliondollar corporation may have a limited number of suitors due to the
corporation’s size or the industry in which it operates.131 Hence a
selling corporation may choose instead to engage in an informal
auction process or to negotiate exclusively with one bidder.
2.

The Presigning Market Canvass and the Negotiated Acquisition

Another alternative available to target companies is the
presigning market canvass, or the informal auction. This is really a
variation on the full-blown auction process. In this type of sale
process, the target, or its financial advisor, contacts a number of
potential bidders to gauge their interest in the target.132 The bidding
process, if one does exist, is in “a less structured setting than that of a
formal auction.”133
The presigning market canvass may help targets avoid the
previously discussed costs involved in a “busted” auction as well as
the costs involved in running a full auction. Moreover, a presigning
(stating that a target weighed the risk of losing a potential buyer if the
target conducted a public auction); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig.,
926 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing the risk of losing an initial
bidder if the target engaged in a public auction and the risk an initial
bidder would pay less if the response to the auction was “under whelming”).
130. See Boone & Mulherin, supra note 47, at 32, 34 (“[T]he costs of
operating auctions often imply that limiting the sales process can induce
more aggressive bidding by those allowed to participate in the
process. . . . The argument for a managed sales process may well be
even stronger in corporate M&A, particularly in cases involving one or a
few large corporate bidders with significant expected synergies with the
seller.”); Pettit et al., supra note 48 (“Generally, auctions drive value up
if the buyer mix is robust. . . . A targeted approach may be warranted
when there is obvious and limited universe of buyers. . . . Whether or
not an auction will be favoured over private negotiation will always
depend on whether the seller is price-driven or motivated by other
factors. Sometimes it’s clear who is going to pay the most for an asset so
there is no real need to run an auction.”).
131. In their research, Professors Boone and Mulherin point to the $23 billion
Wrigley deal in 2008, pursued through one-on-one negotiations with
Mars, and the 2008 Embarq deal with CenturyTel for $5 billion,
resulting from a field of five potential buyers in the telecom industry, as
examples of why large companies are more likely to sell themselves in
one-on-one negotiations rather than auctions. Boone & Mulherin, supra
note 47, at 30–32; see also Boone & Mulherin, supra note 101, at 870
(“[T]he choice of an auction or a negotiation in a particular takeover is
related to characteristics such as target size and industry . . . .”).
132. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 101, at 851.
133. Id.
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market canvass may take place after a previously not-for-sale target
company has been approached by a bidder or in situations where the
target has negotiated initially with only one bidder. In any event, the
interested potential bidders will be required to execute a
confidentiality agreement, typically containing a standstill, before
gaining access to the target’s private information.
Another form of sale process is the negotiated acquisition, or
sequential procedure. In this type of sale process, the target negotiates
exclusively with one potential buyer.134 Like in the other sale
processes, the potential buyer will be required to execute a
confidentiality agreement, generally containing a standstill, prior to
receiving the target’s confidential information. If the initial potential
buyer is willing to pay a high enough price, then the deal will sign
without the target contacting other potential buyers.135 In some
scenarios, a potential buyer may condition its bid on the target not
contacting any other potential buyers or otherwise performing a
market canvass presigning.
3.

Relevant Merger-Agreement Deal Terms and
Postsigning Sales Activities

Regardless of the sales method initially chosen, “[b]ecause of [a]
board’s fiduciary duty to consider higher bids,” an auction-like setting
will likely result from the sales process, thus implicating auctiontheory considerations.136 No matter if the target performs an auction
or negotiates with only one bidder, the resulting definitive merger
agreement will be publicly announced within a day or two of
execution.137 The merger agreement will likely contain a no-shop
provision paired with a fiduciary out. The no-shop provision prevents
the target company from soliciting offers between signing and
closing.138 But the fiduciary out allows a target company’s board of
directors to negotiate with a third party who makes an unsolicited
offer if the third party’s offer is a superior one or if it is reasonably
likely to become a “Superior Offer,” as that term is defined in the
merger agreement.139 In addition, the fiduciary out allows the target
company to terminate the existing agreement in favor of a third-party
134. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.
135. Id.
136. Denton, supra note 25, at 1533.
137. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Do Termination Provisions
Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?, 20 Rev. Fin. Stud. 461,
475 (2007).
138. Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary
Duties, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 55, 72–73 (2010).
139. Id. at 73.
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offer if the board determines it would be a violation of its fiduciary
duties not to do so.140 A typical prerequisite to the target providing
information to, and negotiating with, the overbidder is that the
overbidder must execute a confidentiality agreement with terms that
are no less restrictive than the initial acquirer’s confidentiality
agreement.141 Thus, because the initial acquirer’s confidentiality
agreement generally contains a standstill, the overbidder’s
confidentiality agreement will likely contain a standstill.142 As will be
detailed in Part V, the possibility exists that a target board could use
the standstill as a means of favoring the initial acquirer over the
overbidder.
Recently, parties have also begun to use go-shop provisions in
some transactions.143 Unlike a no-shop provision, a go-shop provision
allows a target company to actively solicit third-party offers
postsigning for a limited period of time.144 Like the no-shop provision,
a typical go-shop provision requires bidders to execute a
confidentiality agreement with no-less-restrictive terms than the
140. Id.
141. See Denton, supra note 25, at 1539–40 (noting that go-shop provisions
typically require “any third-party bidder to sign an ‘Acceptable
Confidentiality Agreement’ with the seller in order to have access to any
material
nonpublic
information”
and
defining
“Acceptable
Confidentiality Agreement” as “any confidentiality agreement between
the Company and any such Person existing as of the date of this
Agreement” and “any confidentiality agreement entered into after the
date of this Agreement that contains provisions that are no less
favorable in the aggregate to the Company than those contained in the
Confidentiality Agreement”); Robert Little et al., No-Shops & Fiduciary
Outs: A Survey of 2012 Public Merger Agreements, Dallas Bar Ass’n
2, 6 (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.dallasbar.org/system/files/dba_presentat
ion--_no-shops_and_fiduciary_outs.pdf (finding, based on data from
fifty-three public-company merger agreements signed in 2012 with
transaction values over $1 billion, that in almost half of the merger
agreements an acceptable confidentiality agreement with an alternative
bidder was one that was “no less favorable” or “not less restrictive”);
see also Transcript of Status Conference and Motion to Expedite at 89,
In re Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A., Nos. 6574-CS &
6776-CS (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2011) (discussing a merger-agreement
provision that required third-party bidders to sign a confidentiality
agreement with a standstill no less favorable than the one between the
merger parties and noting that it is an “accepted norm of deal
negotiation where a merger party insists that later arriving bidders who
are going to have a chance play by certain rules that are as stringent as
the rules that apply to them”).
142. See David Marcus, Confis, Standstills and the Courts, Deal
Pipeline (Oct. 13, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/re
gulatory/confis-standstills-and-the-courts.php.
143. Sautter, supra note 99, at 555.
144. Id. at 557.
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initial acquirer’s confidentiality agreement, meaning the bidder will be
subject to a standstill.145

IV. Current Use of Standstills in M&A Transactions
Although standstills are ubiquitous in today’s public-company
M&A deals, to date, the Delaware courts have not extensively
addressed the use of standstills. In fact, most of Delaware’s guidance
on the use of standstills in M&A transactions comes through dicta.
This Part summarizes those recent cases in which the Delaware Court
of Chancery has commented on standstills. In addition, this Part also
includes a description of two nonlitigated transactions in which
standstills played a significant role in the sales process.
A.

Topps and the Impact of Standstills on the Sales Process

The Delaware Chancery Court’s 2007 In re Topps Co.
Shareholders Litigation146 decision provides some helpful insight on the
role and impact of standstills in a sale of corporate control. Topps
involved a leveraged buyout of Topps Co. by a Michael Eisner–led
group that ensured the retention of the majority of the company’s key
employees and senior management.147
Although a presigning auction or market canvass was
unacceptable under Eisner’s proposal, Eisner agreed to a go-shop
provision.148 Thus, the merger agreement included a forty-day go-shop
provision and “the right to accept a ‘Superior Proposal’ after that,
subject only to Eisner’s receipt of a termination fee and his match
right.”149 At the outset of the go-shop period, Topps’s financial
advisor “contacted 107 potential strategic and financial bidders.”150
The only serious bidder who emerged during the go-shop period was
Upper Deck, a competitor of Topps. Upper Deck’s bid was for
one dollar more per share than the Eisner proposal.151
The Topps board met after the go-shop period expired to
determine whether Upper Deck could continue talks past the

145. See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 66 (Del. Ch.
2007) (recognizing a bidder required to execute a confidentiality
agreement containing a standstill during a go-shop period).
146. 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
147. Id. at 61, 73–74.
148. Id. at 61.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 71.
151. Id.
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expiration of the go-shop period as an “Excluded Party.”152 In
deciding that Upper Deck could not continue talks with Topps, the
Topps board raised potential antitrust concerns and questioned Upper
Deck’s ability to finance the deal.153 Upper Deck then made an
unsolicited proposal and offered “to divest key licenses if required by
antitrust regulators.”154 The Topps board again determined the
unsolicited proposal was not a “Superior Proposal.”155 Perhaps more
importantly for purposes of this Article, the Topps board also rejected
Upper Deck’s request to be released from the standstill agreement,
which prevented Upper Deck from publicly disclosing the information
regarding its discussions with Topps and from launching a tender
offer unconsented to by Topps’ board.156
A group of Topps stockholders and Upper Deck moved for a
preliminary injunction, maintaining that by refusing to release Upper
Deck from the standstill “Topps [was] denying its stockholders the
chance to decide for themselves whether to forsake the lower-priced
Eisner Merger in favor of the chance to accept a tender offer from
Upper Deck at a higher price.”157 Then–Vice Chancellor Strine, who
has since become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware,
began his analysis of the case by acknowledging the “legitimate
purposes” standstills can serve, including establishing rules that
promote an orderly auction and providing a target with leverage in its
negotiations with potential bidders.158 Then–Vice Chancellor Strine
acknowledged, however, that a board could use standstills for
illegitimate purposes like “favor[ing] one bidder over another, not for
reasons consistent with stockholder interest, but because managers
prefer one bidder for their own motives.”159 Then–Vice Chancellor
Strine further recognized that the Topps board’s reservation of the
ability to waive the standstill if the board’s fiduciary duties required
it to do so “was an important thing to do, given there was no

152. Id. at 72. The Upper Deck offer was submitted only two days before the
expiration of the go-shop period. The terms of the Topps-Eisner merger
agreement defined an Excluded Party as “a potential bidder that the board
considered reasonably likely to make a Superior Proposal.” Id. at 65, 71.
153. Id. at 72. These antitrust considerations included the possibility that
authorities might delay or prevent the transaction and Upper Deck’s
failure to sufficiently assume the antitrust risk. Id.
154. Id. at 90.
155. Id. at 72.
156. Id. at 62.
157. Id. at 63.
158. Id. at 91.
159. Id.
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shopping process before signing with Eisner.”160 Additionally, he
recognized the board’s obligation to enforce the standstill only for
“proper purposes.”161
By refusing to release Upper Deck from the standstill, the Topps
board prevented its stockholders from both accepting a potentially
higher offer and from receiving information regarding the
transaction.162 Moreover, the board’s refusal also precluded “Upper
Deck from obtaining antitrust clearance.”163 As a result, then–Vice
Chancellor Strine found that the Topps board’s enforcement of the
standstill was “likely, after trial, to be found a breach of fiduciary
duty.”164 Until quite recently, then–Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision
in Topps was the leading case providing guidance on how deal makers
may use standstills during a sale of corporate control.
B.

Potential Enforceability of DADW Standstills After Topps

Five transactions from 2011 and 2012 provide helpful commentary
on the potential enforceability of DADW standstills. The first two
cases, In re Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation165 and In re
RehabCare Group, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,166 arose in the context
of the Delaware Chancery Court’s approval of settlements. Thus,
those cases simply provide dicta regarding the enforceability of
DADW standstills. However, two significant rulings issued in the final
months of 2012 considered DADW standstills in depth. In In re
Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,167 Vice Chancellor
Laster invalidated a confidentiality agreement because it contained a
DADW standstill.168 In another case, In re Ancestry.com Inc.
Shareholder Litigation,169 then-Chancellor Strine found that the target
board had likely breached its duty of care because of the way it
employed a DADW standstill.170 The Court of Chancery did not weigh
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 92.
163. Id.
164. Id. Then–Vice Chancellor Strine stated that “Upper Deck ha[d] shown a
reasonable probability of success on its claim that the Topps board [wa]s
misusing the Standstill.” Id. at 91.
165. C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012).
166. C.A. No. 6197-VCL, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 208 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011).
167. C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).
168. Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling at 13, Complete
Genomics, Inc., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012).
169. C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
170. In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS, slip op. at
22–29 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
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in on the fifth transaction, Apollo Management VII, LP and
KSL Capital Partners, LLC’s fight for Great Wolf Resorts, Inc.171 But
that deal provides an excellent example of the potentially erosive
effects on shareholder value maximization that some standstills may
have during the preclosing period.
1.

RehabCare and the Questioned Viability of DADW Standstills
Following Topps

From late 2007 through early 2008, RehabCare Group, Inc. and
Kindred Healthcare, Inc. held preliminary discussions regarding
Kindred’s possible acquisition of RehabCare.172 At that time, Kindred
submitted a preliminary indication of interest to acquire RehabCare,
but the discussions ended after the parties were unable to reach an
appropriate valuation for RehabCare.173
After RehabCare’s stock “dropped significantly,” the board
reevaluated its position and met in August 2010 to review strategic
alternatives, including “standalone alternatives, potential acquisition
targets, and potential financial and strategic partners.”174 The
RehabCare board determined the only viable strategic acquirer was
Kindred after considering “four other logical potential strategic
acquirers of RehabCare and the various reasons that each such third
party would not be a likely acquirer.”175 Uncertain of Kindred’s
willingness to proceed with a transaction due to the previous failed
negotiations, the board directed its financial advisor to contact certain
financial buyers to assess their interest in a potential transaction.176
Starting on October 1, 2010, RehabCare’s financial advisor
contacted nine financial buyers, including parties referred to as
Party A and Party B in the SEC disclosures.177 Eight of the nine,
including Party A and Party B, executed confidentiality and DADW
standstill agreements preventing those parties from making
unsolicited offers for RehabCare. Following the execution of these
agreements, Party A and Party B submitted preliminary offers, both
171. See supra Part IV.B.5.
172. RehabCare Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 12, 2011).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. These reasons included, “among others, public statements, prior
business contacts, leverage constraints, recent significant acquisitions,
and various regulatory and legal matters with respect to such third
parties.” Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. The financial buyers “were selected based on their experience in the
healthcare industry and their ability to finance a transaction of this
size.” Id.
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of which the RehabCare board found to be insufficient.178 The other
financial buyers did not submit offers and withdrew from the sales
process.
On November 4, 2010, Kindred expressed to RehabCare an
interest in making an all-cash acquisition of RehabCare at a price
range above that of Party A’s and Party B’s offers.179 A couple of
weeks later, Kindred and RehabCare entered into a confidentiality
agreement, including reciprocal standstill provisions. After conducting
its due diligence review, Kindred submitted its first written offer of
thirty-two dollars per share. Although more than both Party A’s and
Party B’s preliminary offers, the RehabCare board nonetheless
rejected Kindred’s offer as inadequate.
Kindred increased its offer price to thirty-five dollars per share,
of which twenty-six dollars was payable in cash and nine dollars was
payable in Kindred common stock. The parties executed a merger
agreement on February 7, 2011. Following the merger announcement,
a number of RehabCare stockholders brought class action suits
against the RehabCare directors and Kindred. Those suits were
consolidated, and, on May 12, 2011, the parties reached a
memorandum of understanding regarding a settlement.180
Under the settlement, RehabCare and Kindred completely
eliminated matching rights from the agreement, reduced their
termination fee to $13 million, and issued supplemental disclosures.
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, they waived
existing standstill provisions.181 The only issue before the court was
the legal fees for the plaintiff’s counsel.182 With respect to the DADW
standstills, Vice Chancellor Laster commented:
I do think it is weird that people persist in the “agree not to
ask” in the standstill. When is that ever going to hold up if it’s
actually litigated, particularly after Topps? It’s just one of those
things that optically looks bad when you’re reviewing the deal
facts. It doesn’t give you any ultimate benefit because you know
that the person can get a Topps ruling making you let them
ask, at a minimum, or can ask in a back channel way. Why

178. Id. Kindred had expressed an interest in engaging in a transaction but
did not formally submit a bid. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. (reporting that the memorandum of understanding reflected the
parties’ contemplation that “plaintiff’s counsel [would] file petitions for
the award of attorneys’ fees and expenses”); In re Rehabcare Grp., Inc.
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 208, at *12–
13 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011) (granting attorneys’ fees).
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would you hurt yourself in terms of the optics by asking for
that? One of those strange things in life.183

Hence, at least in Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion, even in the
context of a more thorough sales process compared to the sales
process conducted in Topps, DADW standstills may not be upheld
during the preclosing period.
2.

Celera and the Preclosing Period “Informational Vacuum”

Several months after Vice Chancellor Laster’s statement in
RehabCare, Vice Chancellor Donald F. Parsons Jr., again in the
context of a settlement, addressed a similar DADW standstill in In re
Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation.184 The roots of that case began in
November 2009 when the board of directors of Celera Corporation, a
healthcare company, started to consider potential strategic
transactions for the company.185 In early February, the Celera board
instructed its financial advisor and Celera senior management to
engage in discussions with potential strategic buyers regarding a sale
of the whole company, its individual assets, or business units.186
Celera’s financial advisor and CEO “contacted nine potential
bidders, five of which performed at least some measure of due
diligence on the Company by April 2010 . . . .”187 Each of these five
companies executed a confidentiality agreement containing a
standstill preventing them from “making offers for Celera shares
without an express invitation from the Board.”188 The agreements also
included “a broadly worded provision” that prevented the signing
parties from requesting a waiver of this restriction.189
In mid-April, Quest, one of the five parties, made a nonbinding
preliminary offer to acquire the company as a whole for ten dollars,
cash, per share.190 Quest “conditioned its offer upon the execution of
employment agreements with [Celera’s] key personnel including the
[CEO].”191 In addition to the Quest offer, other parties made “lesser
offers” and there was an “indication of interest from ‘Bidder C’” to
183. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 46, In re Rehabcare Grp., Inc.
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011).
184. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP (Del. Ch. Mar.
23, 2012).
185. Id. at 5.
186. Id. at 5–6.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
189. Id. (deeming the agreements “Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Waive Standstills”).
190. Id. at 7.
191. Id.
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acquire only the company’s products division.192 Following
negotiations with Celera’s special committee formed to oversee the
sales process, on June 25, Quest increased its offer to $10.25 per
share, which the special committee deemed acceptable.193 However,
after meeting with the CEO to negotiate her employment agreement,
Quest withdrew its offer, citing the potential effects of a negative
study of one of Celera’s drugs, KIF6, and “‘concerns regarding
retention of the Company’s management” following the merger.194
Throughout the remaining six months of 2010, Celera continued to
pursue strategic transactions but “no serious suitors emerged.”195
During that time “Celera’s business was deteriorating, due in part to
the publication of the negative KIF6 study in October.”196
On January 27, 2011, Quest submitted an offer of $7.75 per share
to acquire Celera. A few days later, Celera rejected an offer from
Bidder C to acquire the company’s products division, instead choosing
to proceed in negotiations with Quest.197 By mid-February, Quest and
Celera entered into a merger agreement.198 Under the agreement,
Quest would commence a twenty-one-day tender offer for Celera
common stock at eight dollars per share.199 The agreement contained a
no-shop provision, requiring Celera “to terminate any existing
discussions with, and not to solicit competing offers from, potential
bidders other than Quest.”200 The agreement also contained a
termination fee amounting to 3.5% of the transaction value, “but
arguably as much as 10% of Celera’s enterprise value.”201
Following the merger announcement, a Celera shareholder
brought suit, alleging that the Celera board had breached its fiduciary
duties by executing an agreement with Quest.202 Celera and Quest
negotiated a settlement with the lead plaintiff, pursuant to which the
termination fee would be reduced and the no-shop provision would be

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 7–8 (indicating that Quest learned of the study during
negotiations with the CEO).
195. Id. at 8.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 9.
199. Id. at 12 (indicating that the offer was made through Quest’s acquisition
subsidiary, Spark Acquisition Corporation).
200. Id. at 13.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 3, 15.
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amended to invite bidders subject to the DADW provision of the
standstill to submit bids.203
Vice Chancellor Parsons issued an opinion upholding the
settlement agreement.204 In the decision, Vice Chancellor Parsons
stated he was not proclaiming DADW standstills unenforceable.205
Moreover, Vice Chancellor Parsons recognized that DADW standstills
are prevalent in today’s M&A world and stated that any opinion
declaring such provisions unenforceable could only be made on an
“appropriately developed record.”206 At the same time, Vice
Chancellor Parsons stated the “[p]laintiffs have at least a colorable
argument that these constraints collectively operate to ensure an
informational vacuum.”207 Once the board is in an “informational
vacuum,” it would not have any information enabling it to evaluate
whether compliance with the merger-agreement terms would violate
the board’s fiduciary duties.208 Thus, he explained, “[c]ontracting into
such a state conceivably could constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty.”209 Following Vice Chancellor Parsons’s analysis, it is difficult to
imagine a DADW standstill that would not have the effect of placing
the board in a change-of-control transaction in the same
“informational vacuum.”
3.

Genomics and the Invalidity of DADW Standstills Preventing Even
Private Indications of Interest

A little over a year after considering the DADW in Rehabcare,
Vice Chancellor Laster addressed head-on the validity of DADW
standstills in In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation.210
He enjoined the enforcement of the DADW standstill without any
suggestion that the sales process was inadequate or that the standstill
restrained any party desiring to make a bid.211 In May 2012, Complete
Genomics, Inc. engaged in a sales process, during which forty-two
parties were contacted and nine parties signed confidentiality

203. Id. at 15 (indicating that the termination fee was reduced from
$23.45 million to $15.6 million).
204. Id. at 3.
205. Id. at 54.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 53.
208. Id. at 53–54.
209. Id. at 54.
210. In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del.
Ch. Dec. 4, 2012).
211. Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling, supra note 168, at 20–21.
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agreements.212 After receiving six proposals, the Complete Genomics
board narrowed the field to two parties—BGI and Party H.213 The
board ultimately reached an agreement with BGI in September.214
Vice Chancellor Laster enjoined the DADW standstill binding
Party J, who had only participated briefly in the sales process.215 In
his ruling, Vice Chancellor Laster started by analogizing illegal
bidder-specific, no-talk clauses216 to DADW standstills, reasoning that
both can similarly disable a board from making a reasonably informed
decision.217 While not ruling that DADW standstills were invalid
per se, Vice Chancellor Laster reasoned that the DADW standstill
agreement prevented the flow of information from Party J and thus
precluded the Complete Genomics board from providing a current and
candid recommendation.218 Citing section 193 of the Restatement of
Contracts, Vice Chancellor Laster found a reasonable probability that
the DADW standstill provision “represents a promise by a fiduciary
to violate its fiduciary duty, or represents a promise that tends to
induce such a violation.”219
Vice Chancellor Laster determined that harm existed because
incoming information from bidders would be prevented under any
circumstance, regardless of whether Party J breached the standstill.220
Thus, his concern focused on the harm caused by the board’s act of
preemptively preventing communication altogether, not the harm that
could result from another party being unable to bid.221 Vice
Chancellor Laster supported his reasoning by adding that a topping

212. Telephonic Ruling of the Court at 7–8, In re Complete Genomics, Inc.
S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL, 8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012).
213. Id. at 8, 22.
214. Id. at 9.
215. Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling, supra note 168, at 13;
Complete Genomics, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement
(Schedule 14D-9) (Sep. 25, 2012) at 16. Party J first expressed interest
only a few weeks prior to the deadline for final proposals from Party H
and BGI. But on August 2, Party J indicated that it would not pursue a
transaction and ended communications with the Complete Genomics
board. Id.
216. Bidder-specific, no-talk provisions were invalidated in Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., C.A. No. 17398, 1999 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 202 (Del. Ch. Sep. 27, 1999).
217. Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling, supra note 168, at 14–18.
218. Id. at 18.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 20.
221. Id. The situation therefore could not be remedied even in the absence of
a bid from Party J. Id.
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bid, presumably by Party H, was present, but he also went on to say
that the reasoning would apply even in the absence of a topping
bid.222 Reflecting this observation, the order invalidated the provision
of the standstill that prevented Party J from making private requests
for permission to submit bids and had no effect on such public
communications.223
4.

Ancestry.com and the Legitimate Use of DADW Standstills for
Value-Maximizing Purposes

Less than three weeks after Vice Chancellor Laster ruled on
DADW standstills in Complete Genomics, then-Chancellor Strine
weighed in, although expressing a very different view on the issue. In
In re Ancestry.com Shareholder Litigation,224 then-Chancellor Strine
was critical of the manner in which the board used the DADW
standstill, but he otherwise sanctioned the general use of DADW
standstills as an auction tool for value-maximization purposes.225
The Ancestry.com sales process began in January 2012 when
Party A, a private equity firm, contacted a representative of
Spectrum Equity Investors to learn more about Ancestory.com, in
which Spectrum owned a 30.7% stake.226 In February of 2012, the
Ancestry.com board was informed of the potential interest expressed
by Party A and decided to explore engaging a financial advisor. On
March 16, the board authorized discussions with Party A, subject to
entry into a confidentiality agreement, which was executed by
Party A later that day. Party A thereafter indicated an interest in
exploring a transaction for a price between thirty and thirtytwo dollars per share. The board decided to perform a market check
to evaluate the indication of interest from Party A.227
On April 22, a representative of private equity firm Permira
Funds contacted Ancestry.com management to discuss a potential
transaction. In May, Qatalyst, the board’s selected financial advisor,
contacted four potential strategic bidders and eight private equity
firms including Party A and Permira.228 Later that month, Permira
and six other private equity firms (Parties C, E, F, G, H, and J)

222. Id. at 23.
223. Complete Genomics, Inc., Amendment No. 12 to Solicitation/
Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9) (Dec. 7, 2012), at 2.
224. C.A. No. 7988–CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
225. Id. slip op. at 23.
226. Ancestry.com Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form PREM14A)
(Oct. 30, 2012), at 16.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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executed confidentiality agreements.229 Two potential strategic
acquirers executed confidentiality agreements—Party I on June 4 and
Party L on July 11—but neither ever submitted a proposal.230
Between June and October, Ancestry.com received bids from
several of these financial investors.231 During that time numerous
newspaper articles reported on the sales process, one of which
commented on the difficulties involved in the auction as a result of
tensions between financial bidders.232 Initially, some parties bid as
high as thirty-eight dollars per share.233 However, after executing
confidentiality statements and conducting due diligence, the parties
each reduced their initial bids.234 Ultimately, the Ancestry.com board
selected four parties—Party C, Party J, Permira, and later Party A—
to invite to submit final bids.235 After Permira submitted the highest
bid at thirty-two dollars per share and indicated it would go no
higher, Permira and Ancestry.com executed a merger agreement on
October 21.236
Litigation was filed challenging the propriety of the DADW
standstills used in the process that were not previously mentioned in
the SEC filings.237 Ancestry.com reacted on December 11 and sent
letters waiving the DADW provisions to allow parties to request
standstill waivers.238 On December 17, then-Chancellor Strine issued
his ruling.239 Careful to take a fact-based approach and not make a
per se ruling, then-Chancellor Strine noted the limited precedential
value of bench rulings generally before discussing Complete Genomics

229. Id. at 17. Party B and Party D, potential strategic acquirers, both
declined to participate in the sales process. Id.
230. Id. at 17, 19.
231. Id. at 18–23.
232. Permira Back in Talks to Acquire Ancestry.com, (Bloomberg TV
television broadcast Oct. 2, 2012); see also Ancestry.com Inc.,
Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 226, at 18 (discussing different
proposals submitted by financial bidders).
233. Ancestry.com Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 226, at 18.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 19, 21 (indicating that Party A was not initially selected as
one of the final bidders but the board later reinvited Party A to
engage in the negotiations).
236. Id. at 25, 26.
237. Ancestry.com Inc., Current Report: Supplement to Proxy Statement
(Form 8-K) (Dec. 19, 2012).
238. Id.
239. In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988–CS (Del. Ch.
Dec. 17, 2012).
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and Celera.240 He contemplated that DADW standstills could be used
consistently with a board’s fiduciary duties, but only when used for a
particular value-maximizing purpose.241 More specifically, he stated
that the “purpose has to be to allow the seller as a well-motivated
seller to use it as a gavel, to impress upon the people that it has
brought into the process the fact that the process is meaningful; that
if you’re creating an auction, there is really an end to the auction for
those who participate.”242
Then-Chancellor Strine went on to find that had the board not
waived the DADW provisions, it would not have been using the
DADW standstill for a specific value-maximizing purpose because it
was not used in the manner he set forth.243 In fact, the Ancestry.com
board and CEO were not even aware of the clause or its potency, and
it was not clear whether Qatalyst was informed either.244 In light of
the waiver, then-Chancellor Strine’s order merely required disclosure
of the circumstances surrounding the use and waiver of the DADW
provision.245
5.

The Potentially Erosive Effects of Standstills on Value
Maximization During the Preclosing Period

In addition to the potential informational vacuum and
communication issues caused by standstills preclosing, if used
improperly, standstills may have other potentially erosive effects on
value maximization. For example, as then–Vice Chancellor Strine
recognized in Topps, target boards can use standstills to favor a
winning bidder over others.246 In addition, winning bidders will
generally advocate for strict standstills as a type of deal-protection
device to preclude losing bidders from any participation after
signing.247 Both of these scenarios became a reality in the 2012 sale of
Great Wolf Resorts.
The sale of Great Wolf began in January 2011, when various
private equity groups and potential strategic buyers approached Great

240. Id. slip op. at 20–22 (“And the Celera case expressly went out of its way
to say it’s not making a per se rule. I think what Genomics and Celera
both say, though, is Woah, this is a pretty potent provision.”).
241. Id. at 23.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 25.
244. Id. at 24–25.
245. Id. at 26.
246. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007).
247. Id.
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Wolf and expressed interest in a potential transaction.248 The
company entered into five confidentiality agreements with strategic
and financial parties, including Apollo.249 Several of the agreements
were revised to include standstill provisions “for the protection of”
Great Wolf.250
In July, Great Wolf’s financial advisor, Deutsche Bank, began a
formal sale process, contacting approximately thirty-eight potential
bidders, both strategic and financial.251 Deutsche Bank distributed
confidentiality agreements to approximately thirty-three parties
interested in a strategic transaction.252 By December, Great Wolf had
entered into confidentiality agreements with eleven additional parties
and continued to amend previously executed confidentiality
agreements with more restrictive standstill covenants.253 Notably, the
Apollo–Great Wolf standstill remained far less restrictive than any
other agreement entered into by Great Wolf.254
As the sales process progressed, the field was narrowed to
Party N, Party J, and Apollo.255 After evaluating the proposals, Great
Wolf agreed to an exclusivity agreement with Apollo on December 20,
based largely on financing considerations and the fact that Apollo had
conducted greater due diligence.256 Several successive extensions of
exclusivity occurred before Great Wolf accepted an offer from Apollo
priced at five dollars per share.257 On March 12, 2012, the transaction,
structured as a tender offer, was approved and executed by Apollo

248. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement
(Schedule 14D-9) (Mar. 13, 2012), at 14.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 11, 15.
251. Id. at 16.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Compare Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Amendment No. 13 to Solicitation/
Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9) (Apr. 25, 2012), at 2
(containing the confidentiality agreements between Great Wolf and
prospective bidders), with Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation/
Recommendation Statement, supra note 248, at 20 (containing the
standstill and confidentiality agreement between Apollo and Great Wolf).
255. Each of these parties had executed confidentiality agreements. Great
Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement, supra
note 248, at 15–19.
256. Id. at 20.
257. Id. at 21–22, 25.
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and Great Wolf, and Apollo began the publicly announced tender
offer the following day.258
The definitive agreement provided a strong deal-protection
scheme for Apollo.259 It contained a no-shop provision and provided
that Great Wolf would not “terminate, waive, amend, modify or fail
to enforce any existing standstill or confidentiality obligations owed
by any Person to the Company or any of its Subsidiaries,” subject to
limited exceptions.260 Under the no-shop provision, Great Wolf was
only permitted to entertain unsolicited bona fide written takeover
proposals.261 Great Wolf also agreed to immediately cease negotiations
with any parties that may be ongoing as of the date of the
agreement.262 Together, the deal protections and reinforced standstill
ensured that losing bidders would not even consider a bid.
After the merger announcement, Great Wolf shares began to
trade well above the five-dollar offer price from Apollo, shareholders
began to publicly criticize the deal, and several lawsuits were filed.263
Thereafter on April 4, despite Apollo’s ironclad deal-protection
scheme, Great Wolf publicly announced the receipt of an unsolicited
bid from KSL Capital Partners at a price of $6.25 per share.264 On
April 5, KSL and Great Wolf entered into a confidentiality agreement
that waived the standstill provisions with respect to the April 4 KSL
proposal and any future favorable proposals from KSL.265 A bidding
258. Id. at 26. The tender offer was scheduled to expire on April 10, 2012.
Apollo Mgmt. VII LP, Tender Offer Statement (Schedule TO)
(Mar. 13, 2012), at S-3.
259. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 12, 2012),
at 9. The deal provisions included an irrevocable top-up option, giving
Apollo the right, if it were to acquire over fifty percent of Great Wolf
shares in the tender offer, to purchase enough new Great Wolf shares at
five dollars per share to obtain ninety percent ownership to accomplish a
short-form merger, and a poison pill that would be triggered if any
party other than Apollo accumulated more than 12.5% of Great Wolf
shares. Id. Additionally, the deal allowed for $7 million in total
termination fees—as opposed to Apollo’s previously proposed
$30 million termination fee—and, in the event that a bidder should be
able to overcome these obstacles, Apollo was granted matching rights.
Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement
(Schedule 14D-9) (Mar. 13, 2012), at 20–26.
260. Exhibit 2.1: Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among K-9 Holdings,
Inc., K-9 Acquisition, Inc. and Great Wolf Resorts, Inc. (Mar. 12, 2012),
at 54 in Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Current Report, supra note 259.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 55.
263. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Solicitation/
Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9) (Apr. 9, 2012).
264. Id. at 19.
265. Id.

560

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
Auction Theory and Standstills

war ensued between Apollo and KSL, ending with a $7.85 offer from
Apollo that was agreed to by Great Wolf on April 20.266
On April 25, an agreement in principle was reached in the
litigation.267 In connection with the settlement, Great Wolf agreed to
make certain disclosures in its SEC filings and waive the standstill
provisions with certain parties to permit confidential unsolicited bona
fide written takeover proposals.268 In addition to exposing the details
of the standstill agreements and the poison pill,269 the disclosures
required by the settlement revealed that during the process, Deutsche
Bank may have had a material conflict of interest, and Great Wolf
may have been aware of it.270 Luckily for the Great Wolf shareholders,
the favorable treatment of Apollo that granted excessive deal
protections, facilitated by the use of a standstill, did not ultimately
prevent the highest offer from being made.
C.

Hollywood Entertainment and the Potential Detrimental Impact of
Standstills During Preclosing Market Checks

The events surrounding the sale of Hollywood Entertainment
Corporation—which operated Hollywood Video stores—best illustrate
the potential detrimental impact of requiring overbidders to execute
the same constrictive standstill to which the initial acquirer is subject
during the postsigning market check. On December 10, 2003, the
Hollywood board met to discuss strategic options after Mark
Wattles—founder, chairman, CEO, and second largest shareholder of
Hollywood Entertainment—learned of various private equity firms
that could potentially acquire Hollywood, including Leonard Green &
Partners (LGP).271
After negotiating with Wattles, LGP signed a nondisclosure
agreement containing a three-year standstill provision, and thereafter
LGP proposed to acquire 100% of Hollywood’s stock for
266. Exhibit 99.1: Press Release, Great Wolf Resorts, Great Wolf Resorts
Says KSL Notifies Company It Does Not Intend to Submit Further
Acquisition Proposals (Apr. 20, 2012) in Great Wolf Resorts, Inc.,
Current Report, supra note 259. “The $7.85 offer price represents a
premium of 171% to the six-month average of Great Wolf’s share price
prior to the announcement of Apollo’s original offer (March 12, 2012), a
premium of 136% over the ninety-day average of Great Wolf’s share
price prior to the announcement of the original offer and a premium of
87% over Great Wolf’s closing stock price on the day prior to the
announcement of the original offer.” Id.
267. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Amendment No. 13, supra note 254, at 5.
268. Id.
269. See supra note 259 for discussion of the poison-pill provision.
270. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Amendment No. 13, supra note 254, at 2.
271. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Preliminary
PREM14A) (Apr. 23, 2004), at 14.
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thirteen dollars per share.272 Hollywood’s special committee rejected
the thirteen-dollar price as inadequate and decided not to solicit
additional bidders, fearing the risks of material-nonpublic-information
leaks or a failed transaction.273 LGP then raised its offer to
fourteen dollars per share, and the parties executed a merger
agreement on March 28.274 The agreement contained a no-shop
provision with a fiduciary out.275
Litigation ensued, provoking a settlement that required additional
disclosures in the proxy statements, a reduction of the termination
fee, and the preclusion of Wattles voting on the merger.276 After LGP
shared its concerns regarding satisfaction of the merger agreement’s
financing condition, the agreement was amended to reduce the price
from to $10.25 and eliminate the termination fee and no-shop
provision.277
Beginning in October, UBS Securities LLC, Hollywood’s financial
advisor, contacted twenty-five potential financial buyers and twelve
potential strategic buyers, including Movie Gallery, Inc. and
Blockbuster, Inc.278 Movie Gallery and Blockbuster requested
confidential information.279 However, to access confidential
information, the amended merger agreement required bidders to enter
into a confidentiality agreement no less favorable to Hollywood than
the one entered into by LGP, which contained a three-year
standstill.280
On November 2, Blockbuster delivered an all-cash proposal of
$11.50 per share, but on November 4, the company also indicated that
it was unwilling to enter into a three-year standstill.281 Movie Gallery
first unsuccessfully sought to revise the standstill term from three
years to one year but, on November 19, inexplicably entered into a
confidentiality agreement identical to the agreement between
Hollywood and LGP, including a three-year standstill.282 Movie
272. Id. at 15.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 19–20.
275. Id. at 51–54.
276. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jul. 8, 2004).
277. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Preliminary Proxy
Statement (Form PRER14A) (Oct. 27, 2004).
278. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Preliminary
PREM14A) (Jan. 26, 2005), at 15.
279. Id. at 15, 18.
280. Id. at 15.
281. Id. at 16.
282. Id. at 17.
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Gallery then increased its offer to $13.25 per share in cash.283
Blockbuster later issued a press release confirming it was interested
and able to raise its offer, subject to elimination of the standstill.284
Hollywood’s special committee met to consider LGP’s indication
that it would waive the obligation under the merger agreement to
include a standstill provision.285 The special committee refused to
eliminate the standstill provision and concluded that including a
standstill for all bidders would not only yield the highest possible
price by encouraging bidders to submit their best offers during the
market-check process—knowing that they would be precluded from
making a later bid—but also assure bidders that the process would be
fair to all involved.286
Blockbuster again issued a press release reiterating its
unwillingness to enter into a three-year standstill, and on
December 28, Blockbuster announced it would commence a tender
offer for Hollywood at $11.50 cash per share.287 On January 10, 2005,
Hollywood announced it had terminated the LGP agreement and
entered into an agreement with Movie Gallery.288 On February 2,
Blockbuster raised its tender offer to a price of $14.50 per share.289
However, on March 25, Blockbuster announced it would no longer
pursue the tender offer.290
Had Blockbuster been brought into the market-check process, its
presence might have pressured a bidding war between strategic
rivals.291 A three-year standstill, as Scott Keller, president of
Dealanalytics.com stated, is “highly unusual,” and “[o]ne year is the
norm.”292 The imposition of onerous standstills like the one in
283. Id. at 18.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 18–19.
286. Id. at 19.
287. Id. at 20.
288. Id. at 22.
289. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Solicitation/Recommendation
(Schedule 14D-9) (Feb. 17, 2005), at 1.

Statement

290. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 25, 2005).
291. After the Blockbuster bid received backing from Carl Icahn, Wattles
stated: “A strategic buyer can afford to pay more for this company than
a financial buyer and I am a financial buyer.” Exhibit 99.1: Jonathan
Berr, Blockbuster Says Hollywood Offer Faces ‘Difficulty’, Bloomberg
(Dec. 22, 2004, 4:46 PM), in Blockbuster Inc., Current Report
(Form 8-K) (Dec. 23, 2004).
292. Id. The three-year standstill requirement imposed on subsequent bidders
stemmed from the original agreement with LGP, when LGP and
Wattles were going to buy Hollywood together. Hollywood Entm’t
Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 278. Wattles was to
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Hollywood Entertainment is not unique in the M&A world. Although
they are common, as Part V details, the imposition of such standstills
is potentially detrimental to shareholders in a sale of corporate control
and is contrary to auction-theory principles.

V. Balancing Friends and Foes in a Sale of
Corporate Control
In most corporate transactions, the parties on both sides of the
negotiating table use contracts to manage and balance risks. In the
context of M&A transactions, standstills are one of the main
contractual tools used to balance risks inherent in the M&A process.
Namely, target boards use standstills legitimately to control the
process and to ensure friendly bidders remain friendly and do not
become foes that preempt the process. However, in the context of a
change-of-control transaction, standstills also potentially carry a risk
that they will inhibit and not enhance shareholder value. This Part
uses auction-theory principles and examples of deal makers’ real-world
uses of standstills to detail how standstills can help enhance the sales
process. But this does not mean that all standstills will universally aid
the value-maximization process in every deal.
A.

Standstills in General: Using Standstills to Make Friends,
Prevent Foes, and Maximize Stockholder Value

With so many moving pieces in a real-world M&A auction, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to rely on one factor to extract higher bids
during the presigning sales process. At the same time, standstills play
an important role in the negotiation and sale of public companies.
Deal makers certainly believe standstills enhance the bidding process
for public targets. But the ultimate question is whether this is truly
the case.
In the case of a pure auction, Professors Bulow and Klemperer
argue that because participants are “relatively ill-informed” when
entering an auction, the auction is “more profitable” than other sale
processes, namely a sequential process.293 Because bidders enter into
most standstills as part of a confidentiality agreement and in
consideration for the receipt of confidential information, many bidders

continue serving as CEO and remain a substantial equity investor in the
surviving company. Id. at 15. The contemplated employment agreement
between Wattles and LGP was to terminate on the third anniversary of
the merger. Exhibit (D)(4): Employment Agreement in Hollywood
Entm’t Corp., Transaction Statement (Schedule 13E-3) (Apr. 23, 2004).
293. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1546.
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would not have access to information if they were not willing to
execute a standstill.294
Thus, by being willing to play by the “rules of the game,” a
bidder is able to engage in due diligence and is on a more level
playing field with respect to information asymmetries. Therefore, a
bidder is better able to make an informed decision regarding its
valuation of the target. Auction theorists have found that by being
provided with proprietary information, a bidder is put at ease and is
more likely to submit a higher bid.295 It follows that standstills likely
enhance the presigning bidding process to the extent standstills are
inextricably tied to the provision of information. Moreover, standstills
may provide bidders with an economic incentive to submit their
highest bid because of the opportunity cost of losing the auction,
perhaps to a competitor, by not submitting the best bid.
Auction theorists have also found that the implementation of
rules and subsequent commitment to those rules play a significant
role in whether a given sales process maximizes stockholder value.296
By implementing rules like standstills, targets are able to control the
sales process. In turn, potential bidders receive some assurance that
another bidder engaged in the process will not preempt the sales
process by submitting a bid prematurely.297 Due to these assurances,
bidders may be more likely to submit a higher bid. Moreover, and
perhaps more importantly, most confidentiality agreements and
standstills prevent bidders from revealing that negotiations are taking
place. That, combined with the fact that standstills prevent bids
before the target is ready to receive them, allows the target to control
the flow of information regarding valuation. As previously discussed,
because most auctions are “sealed-bid” auctions, the bidders are kept
uninformed of each other’s bids so the target is able to ensure that a
high bidder will not reduce its bid or refuse to raise its bid after
learning that the next closest bid is somewhat lower.298
Auction theorists have found that strategic and financial bidders
value companies differently and often rely more heavily on different
types of information in reaching their valuations. Thus, auction
theorists may argue that whether a bidder is willing to submit a
higher bid may turn on another significant factor: whether strategic or
financial bidders are involved in the process. But, as discussed in
294. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 47, at 29 (“In exchange for signing
[standstill] agreements, prospective bidders are given access to nonpublic information about the seller . . . .”).
295. Id. at 34 (“Revealing proprietary information can reduce uncertainty for
some buyers, which increases the price they are willing to pay.”).
296. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1425.
297. See supra Part II.
298. See supra notes 105–08, 119 and accompanying text.
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detail in Part I.A., most real-world M&A sales include both financial
and strategic bidders. Moreover, even if a particular sales process
includes only one type of bidder, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
assume that a particular sales process is a purely common-value one
or a purely private-value one. Thus, the use and validity of
standstills, particularly DADW standstills, cannot turn simply on
whether strategic or financial bidders are involved in the sales process,
and distinctions cannot be drawn based on such an assumption. This
Article assumes that most, if not all, transactions in which standstills
are used have both private-value and common-value characteristics.
B.

Using Restrictive Standstills to Extract More Value
and Make “Friends”

Although standstills generally aid in value maximization, some
standstills may cause adverse effects on a sales process involving
corporate control. In particular, this Part focuses on potentially
restrictive standstills, such as DADW standstills and longer-term
standstills. In another recently published article, Promises Made to be
Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, I
argued the Delaware courts are likely to resolve issues relating to the
reasonableness of standstill restrictions and the grant of a waiver, or
the promise not to waive a standstill, based on the reasonableness of
the target board’s sale process.299 More specifically, I argued the
courts are likely to examine the presigning sales process in resolving
these issues.300 I contended that the more thorough the presigning
sales process, the more likely the Delaware courts would be to uphold
more restrictive standstills like DADW standstills.301 Thus, if a target
were to engage in an extensive full-blown auction process presigning,
the more inclined the Delaware courts would be to enforce a target
board’s refusal to waive a standstill.302 Conversely, if the target were
to engage in a more limited sales process presigning or only negotiate
with one potential bidder, the Delaware courts are more likely to take
issue with a board’s refusal to waive a standstill or to otherwise
enforce a standstill that prevents the board from considering all
possible offers.303 But that article did not address the more
fundamental issue of whether the use of DADW standstills results in
shareholder value maximization. I argue that this question should be
answered by recognizing the need to maintain the standstill’s teeth,
but these teeth should not be sharpened when other deal-protection
mechanisms alleviate the workload borne by standstills postsigning.
299. Sautter, supra note 7, at 988–89.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 988.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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DADW Standstills

In Celera, Vice Chancellor Parsons warned both that DADW
standstills may have the effect of placing the target board in an
informational vacuum and that, once the board is in such a vacuum,
it would not be able to obtain information to evaluate whether
continuing to comply with the merger agreement’s terms would
violate the board’s fiduciary duties.304 As a result, Vice Chancellor
Parsons suggested that the board of directors would be breaching its
fiduciary duties.305 Vice Chancellor Laster then commented in
RehabCare that DADW standstills “optically look bad” and that they
are likely inconsistent with then–Vice Chancellor Strine’s ruling in
Topps.306 Vice Chancellor Laster also seemed to suggest that even in
the context of a fully shopped deal, a DADW standstill may not be
valid.307 Then-Chancellor Strine, the author of the Topps opinion,
then weighed in on DADW standstills in Ancestry.com. In that case,
then-Chancellor Strine focused on whether the standstill was being
used as a “gavel” with a specific value-maximizing purpose and
whether the bidders were made aware that there may not be any
more bites at the apple.308 Although seemingly irreconcilable at first
glance, these opinions can be combined with auction theory principles
and folded into a workable system in which targets can utilize these
more restrictive standstills to enhance value maximization.
In an ideal world, to analyze whether DADW standstills are
legitimate and consistent with auction theory, one would divide the
sales processes into those with mainly strategic bidders and those with
mainly financial bidders because of the unique valuations arising from
each group. However, because in practice most sales processes involve
both strategic and financial bidders, one must assume that the sale
process will have both private value and common value elements. But
the bottom line for all bidders, common value and private value, is
that information, both with respect to the target company and other
304. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL
1020471, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012).
305. Id.
306. In re Rehabcare Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL, 2011
Del. Ch. LEXIS 208, at *46 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011).
307. See Telephonic Ruling of the Court, supra note 212, at 5, 7–8 (declining
to enjoin the standstill provision but recognizing that legal issues were
present even where forty-two parties were contacted as potential
acquirers); see also Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling,
supra note 168, at 18 (finding that a DADW standstill “represents a
promise by a fiduciary to violate its fiduciary duty, or represents a
promise that tends to induce such a violation”).
308. In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988–CS, slip op. 23
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
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bidders, is of paramount importance. As previously discussed,
standstills help to control this flow of information. Moreover, as
auction theorists have found, to the extent that is practical, the
enactment of rules and structure in the auction process aids in
enhancing value and optimizing the auction. Standstills are one of the
tools in a target board’s toolkit. But some limitations must be placed
on the use of the standstills to obtain the most value-enhancing
incentives and to ensure the board’s sale process is consistent with its
fiduciary duties.
First, consistent with then–Vice Chancellor Strine’s indication in
Topps and my argument in Promises Made to be Broken? Standstill
Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, the target board
must engage in significant presigning shopping of the target. Such
presigning shopping may help the board to eliminate the potential for
placing itself in the informational vacuum of which Vice Chancellor
Parsons warns. Second, consistent with then-Chancellor Strine’s
comments in Ancestry.com, all bidders entering into the bidding
process and agreeing to a standstill with the target must be fully
informed of the rules in advance, including the fact that the
standstills will not be waived once the sales process has come to an
end. Third, to maintain the integrity of the sales process, the target
must continue to abide by the rules it sets forth and not make
concessions to one bidder over another or otherwise favor any bidder.
Fourth, unlike the DADW standstills we have seen to date, I contend
the standstill should be paired with a minimal fiduciary out. That is,
a bidder bound by such a standstill should be able to privately
request a waiver if it can set forth compelling and clearly delineated
reasons that it would like to make or increase its bid. These reasons
should be based on external and intervening factors such as the
release of new information, which would cause the bidder to increase
its valuation of the target. This minimal fiduciary out is analogous to
the merger-recommendation fiduciary out for intervening events that
has become popular in recent years.309
In my previous work, I made clear that although the Delaware
courts may likely take a different path based on their dicta to date, I
was of the opinion that boards of directors should not be able to
completely limit their ability to review superior offers in the sale-ofcontrol context.310 Allowing losing bidders to request a waiver and
make an overbid pursuant to a minimal fiduciary out strikes a
balance between the concern that boards should not foreclose
themselves from considering higher bids and the legitimate goal

309. See Sautter, supra note 138, at 59, 85–87, for a description of these
merger-recommendation fiduciary outs for intervening events.
310. Sautter, supra note 7, at 989 n.433.
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supported by auction-theory principles of using standstills to extract
more value presigning.
If such a fiduciary out were to be implemented, it should be
paired with a slightly higher termination fee applicable in these
limited circumstances to these bidders. For example, if the merger
agreement contains a 3% termination fee, a 4 or 4.5% termination fee
may be appropriate. The goal behind the minimal fiduciary out is to
limit or eliminate the informational vacuum these standstills
potentially cause. By pairing the minimal fiduciary out with a slightly
increased termination fee, the goal is to maintain the “teeth” of the
standstill.
Moreover, a similar staggered termination fee has been used in
some recent deals in the context of a change of merger
recommendation based on an intervening event rather than a superior
proposal.311 In those deals, if the board were to terminate the
agreement for an intervening event, a higher termination fee becomes
payable.312 Thus, deal makers have experience in negotiating and
interpreting these intervening events as well as the staggered
termination fees that may be applicable.
The foregoing framework rests on the assumption that the sales
process used is that of a classic auction as described in Part III.B.1.
The likelihood of a classic auction being used as the chosen sales
process is significant because Professors Boone and Mulherin’s study
of 400 corporate takeovers found that half resulted from an auction
process.313 The framework would also work in the context of an
extensive market canvass as described in Part III.B.2. Although deal
makers should opt for less restrictive standstill terms in such
situations because there is a greater risk that they have not shopped
the market and that the value being received is not as high as that
which could be received pursuant to an auction.
2.

Longer-Term Standstills

Standstills with unusually long durations, like that in the
Hollywood Entertainment deal, can be overly restrictive. Hollywood’s
three-year term standstill lasted for a period three times longer than
311. Something Old, Something New . . . : A Quick Survey of Recent
Developments in Public M&A Deal Terms, Kirkland M&A Update
(Kirkland & Ellis LLP), May 2, 2011, at 1 [hereinafter Something Old,
Something New] (mentioning deals that used a higher termination fee
“payable to the buyer if it terminates the deal following an intervening
event change of recommendation by the target”); see also Sautter, supra
note 138, at 102–03 (suggesting a higher termination fee be applicable to
intervening event change of recommendations).
312. Something Old, Something New, supra note 311.
313. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of this study and the auction
process.
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that of an average standstill. Because of this burdensome provision, at
least one major player, Blockbuster, was not even willing to enter into
the standstill agreement and participate in a friendly process.
Considering that the brick-and-mortar movie-rental industry—which
as we now know and leaders of all companies involved in the process
feared—was rapidly declining, a three-year standstill would have
imposed severe limitations on Blockbuster’s ability to pursue a
strategic transaction with Hollywood Entertainment. The same would
hold true for many businesses in today’s rapidly changing global
marketplace, where over a period of three years, entire industries and
business can rise or fall. Implementing such a long standstill could
actually have the reverse effect of value maximization: using a
standstill with such a long duration can deter viable and wealthy
bidders from participating in a friendly process that could result in a
higher bid after confirmatory due diligence. Moreover, such a longterm standstill could cause hostile action, further risking disruption of
a certain, but less favorable, deal already in place.
Further, the Hollywood deal shows the potential harm to future
bidders who are not part of the original sales process or even privy to
a standstill, but who enter the picture after a definitive agreement is
announced. A typical provision in a merger agreement requires that
for any new bidder to gain access to confidential information, it must
enter into a confidentiality agreement no less favorable to the bidder
than the one entered into between the parties to the merger
agreement. Thus, the winning bidder will be able to use this provision
as leverage or to impose an abnormally long standstill on future
bidders to inhibit their ability to make higher proposals and protect
the deal at the expense of shareholders.
While every sales process is different and often the target may
need substantial protections, in most instances the decision to use an
abnormally long standstill will not be value accretive to the sales
process. These standstills are not responsive to changing market
conditions or to new circumstances that arise over a relatively lengthy
sales process. Instead, the term of the standstill should bear a direct
relationship to the industry in which the target operates, taking into
consideration possible market changes as well as the type of sales
process being used. For example, deal makers should consider the
time needed to conduct the sales process—whether it is an auction,
market canvass, or a limited negotiation—and the time it will take to
get to closing. To be reasonable, standstills should be tailored to
account for these factors and should not far exceed the estimated time
to closing.
Opting for a timeframe beyond that estimate makes it appear
that the board is using the standstill for potentially nefarious means.
While standstills should be strong enough to discourage bids outside
of the sales process, they should not be used to completely prevent a
bidder from making any offer at any time. If greater protections or
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incentives are needed, myriad other readily available deal-protection
devices can be used to encourage bidders to put their best bids on the
table.
3.

An Alternative to DADW Standstills

In lieu of using DADW standstills or the revised DADW system
described previously, the target and the winning bidder have other
alternatives in the form of deal-protection devices. A definitive
acquisition agreement for a publicly traded target generally contains a
number of deal-protection devices aimed at preventing third-party
overbids during the preclosing period. In negotiating these dealprotection devices, the target and initial acquirer can tailor those
devices to specifically hinder bids being submitted by bidders who
have previously executed a standstill. More specifically, the parties
could adopt a staggered termination fee such that if the target were
to enter into a transaction with an overbidder who had previously
executed a standstill, that transaction would result in a higher
termination fee than would typically be paid under the agreement.
The possibility of a higher termination fee may incentivize bidders
to submit their best offers during the presigning sales process. For
example, the typical termination fee in an M&A transaction is three
to four percent of the deal value.314 The merger agreement between a
target and a winning bidder could contain a three percent termination
fee applicable to most termination events, including the target’s
termination of the agreement to enter into an agreement with a thirdparty overbidder who was not bound by a standstill. If, however, the
third-party overbidder is a party bound by a standstill, a higher
termination fee, like five, six, or even seven percent, could be
applicable.
Deal makers could also increase the termination fee based on how
well shopped the company was presigning. For example, if the target
held a full public auction presigning, the termination fee applicable to
third-party overbidders bound by a standstill could be higher. This
may further incentivize bidders to submit their highest bids
presigning as a higher termination fee would be applicable to them
postsigning. Moreover, the winning bidder would be further assured
that its deal would be protected by virtue of the termination fee. Of
course for this arrangement to properly incentivize bidders, all bidders
must be made aware, prior to bidding, that the target is willing to
agree to this higher-termination-fee structure in the definitive
acquisition agreement with the winning bidder.

314. Something Old, Something New, supra note 311, at 2 (noting that most
merger agreements provide for a break-up fee between two percent and
four percent of deal’s value).
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C. Standstills that Become Unusually Restrictive When Combined with
Other Contractual Rights: A Backdoor Method of Limiting Stockholder Value

In addition to standstills that may be considered overly restrictive
such as DADW standstills and longer term standstills, a seemingly
less restrictive standstill could be combined with other contractual
rights to result in a scheme detrimental to value maximization. When
standstills continue to impose obligations on all parties after one
party enters into a definitive merger agreement, the world of
contractual rights among bidders and the target substantially change,
but the standstill usually does not. This is a foreseeable event and
perhaps one of the main reasons that standstills contribute to value
maximization. Because the standstill will continue to operate to
restrict the manner in which a losing bidder may make an offer, if an
offer is allowed at all, bidders are incentivized to make their best
offers during the period when offers are freely invited. Further,
bidders know that even if a standstill can somehow be overcome,
there is a cost to jumping a winning deal; thus, most would rather be
the first to sign. However foreseeable a change in position regarding
the standstill is though, bidders will not know the extent of this
change in rights until the merger agreement is announced.
From signing until closing, the same level of inefficiency that
Professors Bulow and Klemperer argue makes the auction more
profitable,315 does not necessarily exist. Of course, new bidders who
have previously neither engaged in due diligence nor been privy to the
target’s confidential information will still be “relatively ill-informed.”
But at the same time, a potential overbidder benefits from knowing
the price being paid by the winning bidder, from seeing the deal
embodied in the merger agreement, and from having access to any
other publicly available information regarding the preexisting deal. In
other words, a potential overbidder can free ride to a certain extent
on the existing deal to make an acquisition proposal. Those bidders
who were part of the presigning sales process and gained access to the
target’s publicly available information are obviously at a greater
advantage in this respect.
Of course, if all the bidders knew that the standstill would
disappear after the signing of an agreement, then all bidders would
not necessarily be incentivized to submit their highest bid before
signing—at least by virtue of the standstill. There are advantages to
being the first to sign however, such as deal-protection devices that
would discourage bidders from submitting uncompetitive bids. But for
standstills to be effective presigning, they must continue after a deal
is signed; otherwise, they may be ignored. Granted that a standstill
needs to continue after a deal is signed to have any integrity, it

315. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1546.
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should not become even more restrictive and made part of an
impenetrable deal-protection scheme.
An excellent example of this potentially impenetrable dealprotection scheme is the Great Wolf deal.316 In that deal, the
standstills executed by the potential bidders seemed to become
DADW standstills, but only after the definitive acquisition agreement
was executed. The bidders in that transaction entered the process and
executed standstills on the belief that they were on a level playing
field. However, without asking for final bids from the bidders, Great
Wolf granted Apollo exclusivity, which ultimately led to an executed
agreement between the two parties. After the execution of the Great
Wolf–Apollo agreement, the previously executed standstills prevented
the bidders from making an offer for Great Wolf.317 Not only did the
standstills continue to restrict bidders interested in Great Wolf, in
combination with the other deal protections embodied in the Great
Wolf–Apollo agreement, a standstill waiver could not be affected.318
Thus, the standstill became, what I would dub, a “Reverse DADW”
standstill. Luckily for the Great Wolf shareholders, however, KSL,
who was uninhibited by a standstill, created the opportunity for a
more fair and open sales process and thereby increased shareholder
wealth by 171%.319 But the other bidders were unable to participate
when KSL entered the picture because of the transformation of the
standstill into a Reverse DADW standstill.
A Delaware court is not likely to find such a Reverse DADW
Standstill to be valid using either Vice Chancellor Parsons’s or now–
Chief Justice Strine’s reasoning. Applying then-Chancellor Strine’s
reasoning from Ancestry.com, the provision was not used as a “gavel”
with the goal of value maximization.320 Based on the facts as
extracted from SEC filings, during its sales process, Great Wolf does
not appear to have asked bidders to make final bids or to have told
bidders in advance of the auction ending.321 Because of this, the
bidders may have been operating under the assumption they could
request a waiver if need be. Instead of using the standstill as a means
of extracting greater value by instructing bidders to submit their best
and final offers for possible deal protection in the resulting agreement,
Great Wolf appears to have used the standstills as a form of dealprotection device which favored Apollo. Under Ancestry.com, this is
316. See supra Part IV.B.5.
317. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 259–62 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 266 and accompanying text.
320. In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988–CS, slip op. 23
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
321. See supra notes 248–57 and accompanying text.
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potentially even more problematic than using a DADW standstill
whereby bidders would be made aware of the consequences.
Not only would these Reverse DADW standstills not carry weight
under now–Chief Justice Strine’s reasoning but also a court applying
Vice Chancellor Parsons’s reasoning would likely find that a target’s
use of such a combination would result in an informational vacuum.322
The bidders previously bound by the standstills would not be able to
make a bid and the target board, like the Great Wolf board, would be
unable to waive the standstill provision to consider potentially higher
bids. The end result then places the board in an informational
vacuum when making its recommendation regarding the contemplated
transaction. Thus, the Reverse DADW standstill combination, like
the Great Wolf DADW standstill, would likely be invalid in Vice
Chancellor Parsons’s view.
In cases like Great Wolf, what begins as a necessary prelude for
the protection of the target and the facilitation of an exchange of
confidential information can turn into both a value-maximization
deterrent for the target and a powerful deal-protection device for the
first party that obtains a signed agreement. Standstills customarily
are used to deter hostile bids or control the auction process and
prevent a bidder from buying the target at a bargain price. When
standstills are combined with other contractual provisions to preempt
the auction process and prevent interested buyers from any further
participation in the sales process, standstills can become an
impediment to value maximization. Reminiscent of the methods used
by the mafia to “eliminate the competition,” basic supply and demand
dictates that the result will allow a bidder to buy the target at a
bargain price.

Conclusion
Standstills, the M&A equivalents of a “school-yard time-out,”323
have become standard features of the public company sales process.
Despite the prevalence of standstills, courts and academics alike, have
not fully addressed the role of standstills in the sales process or
whether they aid in maximizing stockholder value. Auction theorists
agree that a significant factor in any M&A sale process is the presence
of asymmetric information. In most auctions, standstills allow the
target to control the process by keeping bidders uninformed of each
other’s bids and ensuring that no bidder will preempt the process
while giving bidders access to its proprietary information, assuring
bidders of their valuation. Thus, standstills help to enhance the sales
322. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL
1020471, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012).
323. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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process by selectively controlling information releases to encourage
higher bids. As such, standstills at least aid in providing a floor for
the valuation of the target. In doing so, standstills help to keep
bidders friendly.
At the same time, however, when standstills are enhanced to
provide greater restrictions on the sales process or to perform
functions after the execution of a definitive agreement with a winning
bidder, there is a risk these restrictions could have detrimental effects
on value maximization. This Article uses auction theory to provide a
framework under which more restrictive standstill provisions, like
DADW standstills, may be used legitimately under certain
circumstances to extract value from bidders. This framework takes
into account several factors including that DADW standstills only be
used pursuant to a thorough shopping process in which all bidders are
informed that they may never have another bite at the apple.
Moreover, this framework provides that such standstills be paired
with a minimal fiduciary out based on intervening events that carries
a slightly increased termination fee. Other forms of restrictive
standstills, such as standstills with long durations or reverse DADW
standstills, should be declared invalid. As an alternative to DADW
standstills, or even the revised DADW framework advocated in this
Article, I suggest using a staggered termination fee that can better
achieve value maximization with less risk. In adopting the framework
set forth in this Article, deal makers would strike a balance between
keeping bidders from becoming foes to the winning bidder while at the
same time encouraging the maximization of stockholder value.
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